Scorpions - Always Somewhere (Lyrics)

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精神分裂病検査のない違法措置入院、逮捕状のない大阪拘置所違法24日間拘留

私は、文部科学省脳科学研究戦略推進プログラム、理化学研究所人体実験被害者です。法務省、大阪地検、大阪高検、米子地検、大阪簡易裁判所、最高裁は、捏造社民党名誉毀損事件を画策、家宅捜索礼状のない家宅捜索、逮捕状のない大阪拘置所違法24日間拘留によって、自民党、公明党、社民党、共産党、学者と全大学、全企業、全官公庁による窃盗、夫殺害、株不正売買、米子市養和病院違法措置入院、40にも及ぶ違法有料ブログ解約、厚生労働省、医師会、歯科医師会、看護士会、介護士会、各政党と党員、キリスト教、天台宗、創価学会、幸福の科学、ものみの塔など宗教法人と信者による音声送信とストーカー、嫌がらせ、自民党社民党によるOCN、EDIONenjoy違法プロバイダ解約等の証拠隠滅を行いました。私は、詩人、エッセイストでもあり、翻訳家でもありますが、私の詩、エッセイ、翻訳詩、翻訳小説、翻訳文を、日本政府は、世界中に売っています。

2016年10月12日水曜日

東方経済フォーラム全体会合 安倍総理スピーチ2

外務省のホ一ムペイジ同様、英作文に間違いが多く、英文を訳せません。

石破荗、三井グル一プ、と田中派木曜会、水月会、民主党、社民、共産、生活の党による政府ホムペ一ジ改竄は、米子市で行われています。

平成28年9月3日
東方経済フォーラム全体会合 安倍総理スピーチ
English
Chinese

司会のケヴィン・ラッド豪州元首相、御紹介ありがとうございます。そして朴槿恵大統領、再びお会いできて大変光栄に思います。何よりもウラジーミル・プーチン大統領、お招きに応じて、初めてウラジオストクの地を踏むことができました。心より嬉しく思っております。
今回は、もちろん飛行機でやって来ました。しかしこの街では、港がその玄関です。海から見ると一際美しいといいますから、ウラジオストクは本来なら、船で来るべき街なのかもしれません。約百年前、湾内から見た景色に息を呑み、「ここより美しい場所が、何処にあるだろう」と著書に記した人がいます。かの有名な、極地探検家のフリチョフ・ナンセンでした。
街の中にも訪れたい場所があります。アリューツカヤ通りへ行くと、「王様と私」でオスカーを取ったユル・ブリンナーの生家があって、銅像も立っているそうです。ここは外せません。
それからプーチン大統領ならよく御存知の、ロシアに初めて講道館柔道をもたらしたワシリー・オシェプコフは、コラベリナヤ通り21番地というところで最初の道場を開いたそうです。その建物もまだ残っているのでしょうか。そんなあちこちへ行くのは、いつかまた来た時の楽しみに取っておきます。
その「いつか」を、そう遠くない将来にしたいと思っています。どうしてかは、後ほど申し上げたいと思います。
プーチン大統領は、議会に報告する年次教書で毎年、国家発展のため最も重要なのは、ロシア極東地域の開発だと指摘しています。ウラジオストクを「自由港」とし、これをモデルに、他の港湾都市も自由港にするお考えです。ウラジオストクに、往年の、真の国際都市としての面目を取り戻させたいと思っておいでなのでしょう。
プーチン大統領のそんな夢は、私の夢でもあります。プーチン大統領、このウラジオストクを、ユーラシアと太平洋とを結ぶ、ゲートウェイにしようではありませんか。
太平洋は、今、自由で、公正で、開かれた経済圏へと、進化を遂げようとしています。ユーラシアという広大な後背地は、そのダイナミズムに、さらなる弾みを与えることでありましょう。ウラジオストクの輝きは、太平洋の隅々までを照らす、巨大な相乗効果を生み出すと確信しています。
プーチン大統領、先般ソチでお会いした時、私は大統領に、日本がロシアに協力できる分野を8つに絞り込んで提案しました。
その1つに、「快適・清潔で、住みやすく、活動しやすい都市づくり」を挙げています。これを両国で実施するためのモデル都市として、ウラジオストクくらい、ふさわしい街はないと思います。
郷愁を誘う(いざなう)、革命前の建築物、ソヴィエト時代の特徴あるデザイン、それに現代の意匠が入り混じり、海と、丘からなる独特の美を生かしながら、住民にとって便利で、観光客にとっては魅力あふれるウラジオストクを育てていく営みに、日本を加えてください。真剣な提案です。是非とも一緒にやろうではありませんか。

今度の旅を準備する過程で、ロシアの人口統計を目にする機会がありました。そして、私は驚かざるを得ませんでした。
1976年からの10年間に生まれた男女が2300万人近くに達しているのに、今ちょうど10代の人口となると、1400万人を切っています。96年からの10年に生まれた人たちで、統計はあたかも、90年代後半に、ロシアがくぐった困難を物語っているようであります。
世界でも稀なことに、ロシアは、平均寿命の着実な向上と、人口の増加を成し遂げつつあります。就学期の子供が増えて学校が足りないという、日本から見ると誠に羨ましい現実が生まれました。
しかし、生産年齢人口はこれから顕著に減っていき、しわ寄せは、いまの10代に、集中して及ぶことでしょう。彼らが働き盛りになる頃には、老人医療の負担が重くのしかかります。私たちはそこに目を留めて、「最先端の医療施設を整備して、ロシア国民の健康寿命を伸ばす」という提案を、8項目の第1に掲げました。
日本の問題は、よく似ています。少子高齢化が進む日本では、医療・年金制度に負担がかかります。老いていく世代に健康を維持してもらうため、あらゆる施策を打たなければなりません。ですから人口統計に感じるプーチン大統領の悩みは、私の悩みでもあります。
プーチン大統領は、ロシアの10代たちに対し、年長世代が多いからといってひるまず頑張れと、励ましておいでです。日本の若者に必要な激励も、実はまったく同じものです。
ただし、こうした問題に即効薬はありません。政治指導者にできることは、国家の命運を常に20年、30年という長い尺度で考えることです。勇気を持って問題に直面し、創造的な政策を打ち出しては、倦まず、弛まず働いて、確実に実行していくことだけです。
このように言うと、きっと朴槿恵大統領も頷いてくださると思います。未来はすぐ良くならないかもしれないが、頑張りさえすればきっと良くなると若い世代に思ってもらうには、一体何をすべきか。私たちには共通の課題があり、悩みがあるのだと思います。

皆様、経済成長をもたらすには、手段は3つしかありません。資本ストックの更新と、労働投入の増加、それに労働生産性の向上です。私の経済政策、いわゆる「アベノミクス」は、この3要素全てに働きかけることで、なんとか日本の成長を押し上げようとしています。
しかし経済学者が一致して言うように、成長にとって他の何よりも重要なのは、人間の「期待」です。人々が、明日はきっと、今日より良くなると信じることが、全ての基本です。
そのためにも、プーチン大統領、まずあなたと私とで、日本とロシアの最も緊密な協力が生み出す将来の可能性について、強い確信を共有しましょう。
ロシアと日本の経済は、競合関係にありません。見事に補完する間柄だと、私は確信しています。需要面でも、供給面でも、互いに刺激し合い、伸びていく未来を思いましょう。両国民がそこに明るい未来を託せるように、必要なことをすべてやっていきましょう。
例えば中小企業同士の協力は、大いに有望です。エネルギー資源の開発とその生産能力の拡充は、双方をwin-winにする最たるものです。
ロシア産業の多様化を進めて生産性を上げ、それを生かしながら、ロシア極東地域を、アジア太平洋に向けた輸出の拠点にしましょう。先端技術の協力と人的交流に弾みをつけ、つまりは未来への投資を、共に進めようではありませんか。
そこでプーチン大統領に、新しい提案をいたします。年に一度、ウラジオストクで会い、この8項目の進捗状況を、互いに確認しませんか。時にはタイガの原生林に入って、黒澤明監督が「デルス・ウザーラ」で撮った木々の木漏れ日に包まれながら、20年、30年先、日本とロシアはどんな関係にならねばならないかを考えましょう。   そのために、今何をなすべきか、日常を離れてゆっくり相談する機会を毎年持つという、そういう提案です。会場の皆様も、今拍手で、良い提案だと御賛同をいただいたと、このように思います。
何より、そうすればウラジオストクに毎年来ることができます。

会場においでの、ロシア経営者の皆様。皆様が渡ってこられた橋の建設には、日本の杭打ち機が使われました。この会場の電気は、日本のガスタービンが作り出しています。皆様一刻も早く、日本企業と働く経験を積み重ねてください。
日本企業の生産現場には、必ずと言っていいほど、生産ラインの効率を良くしようと打ち込む労働者の姿があります。ボトムからの改善を求める声が、管理者、設計者に届くようになっています。一歩一歩、現場の智慧を生かして不良品を減らし、安全性、効率を上げる「カイゼン」が、そうして定着しました。上意下達や階級差のない日本の労働現場で、初めて生まれた独創です。
また、競争的な市場では、価値はマーケットが決めるもので、企業の自由になりません。このとき、品質を落とさずに、競争の中、それでも利益を保って勝ち抜くにはどうすればいいでしょうか。
コストを下げて、粗利を確保するのだと割り切って、まさしく「カイゼン」の手法に拠りながら、工程で無駄を削り取ったのが日本企業です。
どこに珍しさがあるのかと言わないでください。日本企業がやって見せるまで、「安い、しかし良い」モノづくりなど、できないと信じ込まれてきました。ハーバード・ビジネススクールのマイケル・ポーター教授が、そう指摘しています。
多くの国々が、早く、この手法に習熟する中で、そのうねりは、まだロシアの地には到達していない。日本企業と深く付き合うことで起きる生産思想の革新を、ロシアはまだ経験していません。
プーチン大統領、目指しておられる生産業大国へ至る道には、実証済みの近道がある。日本企業と組むことだと、声を大にして申し上げたいと思います。
ウラジーミル、あなたと私には、この先、大きな課題が待ち受けています。
限りない可能性を秘めているはずの、重要な隣国同士であるロシアと日本が、今日に至るまで平和条約を締結していないのは、異常な事態だと言わざるを得ません。
私たちは、それぞれの歴史に対する立場、おのおのの国民世論、そして愛国心を背負って、この場に立っています。日本の指導者として、私は日本の立場の正しさを確信し、ウラジーミル、あなたはロシアの指導者として、ロシアの立場の正しさを確信しています。
しかしこのままでは、あと何十年も、同じ議論を続けることになってしまいます。それを放置していては、私も、あなたも、未来の世代に対してより良い可能性を残してやることはできません。
ウラジーミル、私たちの世代が、勇気を持って、責任を果たしていこうではありませんか。あらゆる困難を乗り越えて、日本とロシア、2つの国がその可能性を大きく開花させる世界を、次の世代の若い人たちに残していこうではありませんか。この70年続いた異常な事態に終止符を打ち、次の70年の、日露の新たな時代を、共に切り開いていこうではありませんか。
無限の可能性を秘めた二国間関係を未来に向けて切り開くため、私は、ウラジーミル、あなたと一緒に、力の限り、日本とロシアの関係を前進させていく覚悟であります。
御清聴ありがとうございました。

Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the 2nd Eastern Economic Forum

Saturday, September 3, 2016

[Provisional translation]

Mr. Kevin Rudd, thank you for your kind introduction. President Park Geun-hye, it is an honour to see you again. And most of all, President Vladimir Putin, I am truly delighted at this, my first opportunity to set foot in Vladivostok, in response to your gracious invitation.
ケヴィン・ラッドゥさん、貴方の丁寧な紹介に感謝致します。パク・クネ大統領、貴方に又会えて光栄です。とりわけ、ウラジーミル・プ一チン大統領、私は、貴方の親切な紹待に応じ、この、ウラジオストックに足を踏み入れる私の初めての機会を得て、本当に嬉しく思っております。

22:16 2016/10/11火

This time, of course I came here by airplane.
この度は、勿論、私は、ここに飛行機で参りました。外務省のホ一ムペイジ同様、英作文に間違いが多く、英文を訳せません。

But this city has a port as its doorway, and it is often said that Vladivostok is even more stunning when seen from the sea. So, really, this is perhaps a city we should come visit by ship.
しかし、この街には、その戸ロとしての港があり、ウラジオストックは、

16:34 2016/10/12水

About a century ago, a visitor struck breathless at the scenery greeting him in the harbour penned the line, “One can scarcely conceive a more beautiful situation.” The writer was none other than the world-famous polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen.

There are some places I would really like to visit in this city.

I understand that if you head to Aleutskaya Street, you will find the house that was the birthplace of Yul Brynner, who won an Oscar for his work in “The King and I,” along with a statue memorializing him. I simply can’t miss out on a visit there.

And I have heard that Vasiliy Ochepkov, who, as President Putin knows very well, introduced Kodokan judo to Russia, instituted the first dojo -- that is, the first hall for practicing judo -- at Korabelnaya Street No. 21. I wonder if that building is also still with us today. I am saving all these sights for when I come again someday.

And I hope to make that “someday” a day in the not too distant future. Let me explain why later on in my remarks.

Every year in your annual address to the Federal Assembly, President Putin, you highlight the development of Russia’s Far East region as the most important factor for national development. By making Vladivostok a “free port” and setting it forth as a model, you hope to make other port cities into “free ports” as well.

I imagine you wish to restore the prestige Vladivostok enjoyed at one time as a truly international city.

That dream that President Putin holds is my dream as well. Mr. President, you are looking to make Vladivostok a gateway linking Eurasia and the Pacific, am I correct?

The Pacific Ocean is now poised to evolve into a free, fair, and open economic zone. The vast Eurasian land area lying beyond this city will provide further impetus to its dynamism. I am firmly convinced that the sparkle of Vladivostok will light up even the farthest reaches of the Pacific Ocean and give rise to enormous synergistic effects.

President Putin, when we met not long ago in Sochi, I presented you with an eight-bullet-point proposal in which I had narrowed down a list of fields where Japan can cooperate with Russia.

One of these was “creating cities that are clean and comfortable and easy to live and work in.” Am I right in saying there is no other city so suited as Vladivostok to serve as a model city for our two countries to carry this out?

Please do add Japan in to this task of cultivating Vladivostok to be a city convenient for its residents and brimming with appeal for its tourists, mixing modern motifs into the nostalgia-inducing pre-revolution architecture and the characteristic Soviet-era designs while taking full advantage of the unique beauty of the sea and the hills. I make this proposal in all earnestness. Let us make this a reality together, shall we not?

*****

While preparing for this trip, I had the opportunity to look at Russia’s demographic statistics, and I couldn't help but be surprised.

Although close to 23 million people were born in the decade beginning in 1976, the current population aged 10 to 19 now falls short of 14 million. It was as if the statistics showing the number of people born in the decade beginning in 1996 were telling the tale of the difficulties Russia experienced in the late 1990’s.

As a rare occurrence even globally, Russia has been achieving a steady rise in its average life expectancy as well as increases in its population. With an increasing number of school-age children and an insufficient number of schools as a result, the reality which has emerged is enviable from the Japanese standpoint.

However, the working-age population will decrease remarkably in the years to come, and there will be a shift in the burden, concentrated on the people who are now in that 10-to-19 age bracket.

Just as they are entering the prime of life, the burden of medical care costs for the elderly will weigh heavily upon them. Taking notice of that, we put forth our proposal of “lengthening the healthy life expectancy of the Russian public by preparing state-of-the-art facilities for health and medical care” as the first of the eight items.

The issues Japan faces are similar indeed. In Japan, where we face an increasingly aging society alongside a falling birth-rate, a burden will fall upon the medical care and the pension system. We must hammer out wide-ranging policies and measures so that the members of our greying generation maintain their health. Therefore the concerns President Putin harbours about demographics are the very same concerns that I myself have.

President Putin, I imagine you are encouraging Russia’s teenagers to work hard going forward without flinching, because there are so many people in the older generation. The necessary encouragement for Japan’s youth is in fact one and the same.

However, there is no quick-acting remedy for this issue. What political leaders can do is to think of the destiny of the nation always over a long scale of 20 or 30 years. Once we have bravely faced the issues and hammered out creative policies, it is simply a matter of working tirelessly to bring them into execution without fail.

In saying this, I imagine that President Park will also nod her head in agreement. What should we do in order to have the young generation think that although the future may not become better immediately, we can certainly do better if only we work hard? I believe we have this as a challenge and also a worry we all share in common.

*****

Ladies and gentlemen, there are only three means for bringing about economic growth. These are the renewal of capital stock, an increase in labour input, and gains in labour productivity. My economic policies known as “Abenomics” are now aiming to boost Japan’s growth by actively working on all three of these elements.

However, economists all agree in saying that what is more important than anything else for growth is the expectations of the public.

The basis for everything is people believing that tomorrow will be better than today.

For this reason, President Putin, first of all let you and me share in a strong conviction regarding the potential of the future that the closer cooperation between Japan and Russia will bring about.

The economies of Russia and Japan are not in rivalry. I am fully confident that ours is a relationship in which each complements the other in a magnificent way.

Let us envision a future in which we both grow, each providing stimulation to the other in both demand and supply aspects. And let us do everything necessary so that the people in both our countries entrust their bright futures to such a relationship.

For example, cooperation between small- and medium-sized enterprises is extremely promising. The development of energy resources and the expansion of their production capacity will be a prime example of creating a win-win situation.

Let us make the Far East Russia region a base for exports to Asia and the Pacific region while raising productivity by moving forward with the diversification of Russian industries and then taking full advantage of that. Shall we not move forward together in generating momentum for cooperation in advanced technologies and people-to-people exchanges -- in other words, in investing towards the future?

Given that, President Putin, I will present to you a new proposal. Let us meet once a year in Vladivostok to confirm with each other the state of progress of these eight points.

Let us occasionally enter the virgin taiga forest, get enveloped in the sunlight filtering through the trees that appeared in Akira Kurosawa’s Dersu Uzala, and together consider what kind of relations Japan and Russia must have 20 or 30 years into the future.

This is a proposal that every year we have an opportunity to move away from our daily obligations to have relaxed discussions about what we should do now to bring that about. Ladies and gentlemen in the audience, do you not think this is a good idea?

Most importantly, by doing so I will be able to come to Vladivostok every year.

*****

To the Russian executives here in the audience, let me tell you that Japanese pile drivers were used in constructing the bridge you crossed to be here today. And it is Japanese-made gas turbines producing the electricity used in this hall.

I hope that all of you accumulate many experiences working together with Japanese companies at the earliest possible time.

It is no exaggeration to say that invariably, the manufacturing worksites of Japanese companies are staffed by workers putting their heart and soul into improving the efficiency of the production line. Calls to improve the system from the bottom reach the managers and designers.

This is how “kaizen,” which uses the wisdom of the workplace to reduce the number of defective goods while increasing safety and efficiency step by step, came to take root. It is a kind of ingenuity first developed at Japan’s worksites, which are not authoritarian but egalitarian.

In addition, in competitive markets, prices are determined by the markets themselves, not freely decided by the companies. In such circumstances, without sacrificing product quality, what should be done amidst competition, in order to ensure a profit and emerge a winner?

It is Japanese companies that, truly grounded in the technique of “kaizen,” found a solution of lowering costs and ensuring gross margins and shaved waste off of production.

Please don’t ask what is so special about that. Until Japanese companies showed the way, manufacturing things that were “both cheap and well-made” was thoroughly believed to be impossible. Professor Michael Porter of Harvard Business School has pointed that out.

Despite a large number of countries mastering this technique early on, that surge has still not arrived in Russia. Russia has not yet experienced the innovation in production ideology that arises through interacting intensely with Japanese companies.

President Putin, the road to becoming the manufacturing power you are aiming at has a proven shortcut. And that is partnering with Japanese companies, I can proclaim emphatically.

*****

Vladimir, one big, big issue awaits you and me down the road.

I cannot help but say that it is an unnatural state of affairs that the important neighbors of Russia and Japan, which surely have unlimited potential, have to this day not yet concluded a peace treaty.

We stand here today shouldering our respective viewpoints on history, as well as our own particular public opinion and patriotic spirit. As the leader of Japan, I am firmly convinced of the correctness of the Japanese position, while you, Vladimir, as the leader of Russia, are entirely confident of the correctness of the Russian position.

Yet if we continue on like this, this very same discussion will continue for yet more decades to come. By leaving the situation as it is, neither you nor I will be able to leave better possibilities to future generations.

Vladimir, shall our generation not be the one to have the courage to fulfil our responsibilities? Shall our two countries, Japan and Russia, not overcome all manner of difficulties to leave to the young people of the next generation a world that makes those possibilities come into full bloom? Putting an end to the unnatural state of affairs that has continued these 70 years, shall we not together carve out a new era for Japan and Russia going forward?

Vladimir, in order to carve out towards the future bilateral relations overflowing with unlimited potential, I am resolved to putting forth all my strength to advance the relationship between Japan and Russia, together with you.

2016年10月11日火曜日

東方経済フォーラム全体会合 安倍総理スピーチ1

平成28年9月3日
東方経済フォーラム全体会合 安倍総理スピーチ

司会のケヴィン・ラッド豪州元首相、御紹介ありがとうございます。そして朴槿恵大統領、再びお会いできて大変光栄に思います。何よりもウラジーミル・プーチン大統領、お招きに応じて、初めてウラジオストクの地を踏むことができました。心より嬉しく思っております。
今回は、もちろん飛行機でやって来ました。しかしこの街では、港がその玄関です。海から見ると一際美しいといいますから、ウラジオストクは本来なら、船で来るべき街なのかもしれません。約百年前、湾内から見た景色に息を呑み、「ここより美しい場所が、何処にあるだろう」と著書に記した人がいます。かの有名な、極地探検家のフリチョフ・ナンセンでした。
街の中にも訪れたい場所があります。アリューツカヤ通りへ行くと、「王様と私」でオスカーを取ったユル・ブリンナーの生家があって、銅像も立っているそうです。ここは外せません。
それからプーチン大統領ならよく御存知の、ロシアに初めて講道館柔道をもたらしたワシリー・オシェプコフは、コラベリナヤ通り21番地というところで最初の道場を開いたそうです。その建物もまだ残っているのでしょうか。そんなあちこちへ行くのは、いつかまた来た時の楽しみに取っておきます。
その「いつか」を、そう遠くない将来にしたいと思っています。どうしてかは、後ほど申し上げたいと思います。
プーチン大統領は、議会に報告する年次教書で毎年、国家発展のため最も重要なのは、ロシア極東地域の開発だと指摘しています。ウラジオストクを「自由港」とし、これをモデルに、他の港湾都市も自由港にするお考えです。ウラジオストクに、往年の、真の国際都市としての面目を取り戻させたいと思っておいでなのでしょう。
プーチン大統領のそんな夢は、私の夢でもあります。プーチン大統領、このウラジオストクを、ユーラシアと太平洋とを結ぶ、ゲートウェイにしようではありませんか。
太平洋は、今、自由で、公正で、開かれた経済圏へと、進化を遂げようとしています。ユーラシアという広大な後背地は、そのダイナミズムに、さらなる弾みを与えることでありましょう。ウラジオストクの輝きは、太平洋の隅々までを照らす、巨大な相乗効果を生み出すと確信しています。
プーチン大統領、先般ソチでお会いした時、私は大統領に、日本がロシアに協力できる分野を8つに絞り込んで提案しました。
その1つに、「快適・清潔で、住みやすく、活動しやすい都市づくり」を挙げています。これを両国で実施するためのモデル都市として、ウラジオストクくらい、ふさわしい街はないと思います。
郷愁を誘う(いざなう)、革命前の建築物、ソヴィエト時代の特徴あるデザイン、それに現代の意匠が入り混じり、海と、丘からなる独特の美を生かしながら、住民にとって便利で、観光客にとっては魅力あふれるウラジオストクを育てていく営みに、日本を加えてください。真剣な提案です。是非とも一緒にやろうではありませんか。

今度の旅を準備する過程で、ロシアの人口統計を目にする機会がありました。そして、私は驚かざるを得ませんでした。
1976年からの10年間に生まれた男女が2300万人近くに達しているのに、今ちょうど10代の人口となると、1400万人を切っています。96年からの10年に生まれた人たちで、統計はあたかも、90年代後半に、ロシアがくぐった困難を物語っているようであります。
世界でも稀なことに、ロシアは、平均寿命の着実な向上と、人口の増加を成し遂げつつあります。就学期の子供が増えて学校が足りないという、日本から見ると誠に羨ましい現実が生まれました。
しかし、生産年齢人口はこれから顕著に減っていき、しわ寄せは、いまの10代に、集中して及ぶことでしょう。彼らが働き盛りになる頃には、老人医療の負担が重くのしかかります。私たちはそこに目を留めて、「最先端の医療施設を整備して、ロシア国民の健康寿命を伸ばす」という提案を、8項目の第1に掲げました。
日本の問題は、よく似ています。少子高齢化が進む日本では、医療・年金制度に負担がかかります。老いていく世代に健康を維持してもらうため、あらゆる施策を打たなければなりません。ですから人口統計に感じるプーチン大統領の悩みは、私の悩みでもあります。
プーチン大統領は、ロシアの10代たちに対し、年長世代が多いからといってひるまず頑張れと、励ましておいでです。日本の若者に必要な激励も、実はまったく同じものです。
ただし、こうした問題に即効薬はありません。政治指導者にできることは、国家の命運を常に20年、30年という長い尺度で考えることです。勇気を持って問題に直面し、創造的な政策を打ち出しては、倦まず、弛まず働いて、確実に実行していくことだけです。
このように言うと、きっと朴槿恵大統領も頷いてくださると思います。未来はすぐ良くならないかもしれないが、頑張りさえすればきっと良くなると若い世代に思ってもらうには、一体何をすべきか。私たちには共通の課題があり、悩みがあるのだと思います。

皆様、経済成長をもたらすには、手段は3つしかありません。資本ストックの更新と、労働投入の増加、それに労働生産性の向上です。私の経済政策、いわゆる「アベノミクス」は、この3要素全てに働きかけることで、なんとか日本の成長を押し上げようとしています。
しかし経済学者が一致して言うように、成長にとって他の何よりも重要なのは、人間の「期待」です。人々が、明日はきっと、今日より良くなると信じることが、全ての基本です。
そのためにも、プーチン大統領、まずあなたと私とで、日本とロシアの最も緊密な協力が生み出す将来の可能性について、強い確信を共有しましょう。
ロシアと日本の経済は、競合関係にありません。見事に補完する間柄だと、私は確信しています。需要面でも、供給面でも、互いに刺激し合い、伸びていく未来を思いましょう。両国民がそこに明るい未来を託せるように、必要なことをすべてやっていきましょう。
例えば中小企業同士の協力は、大いに有望です。エネルギー資源の開発とその生産能力の拡充は、双方をwin-winにする最たるものです。
ロシア産業の多様化を進めて生産性を上げ、それを生かしながら、ロシア極東地域を、アジア太平洋に向けた輸出の拠点にしましょう。先端技術の協力と人的交流に弾みをつけ、つまりは未来への投資を、共に進めようではありませんか。
そこでプーチン大統領に、新しい提案をいたします。年に一度、ウラジオストクで会い、この8項目の進捗状況を、互いに確認しませんか。時にはタイガの原生林に入って、黒澤明監督が「デルス・ウザーラ」で撮った木々の木漏れ日に包まれながら、20年、30年先、日本とロシアはどんな関係にならねばならないかを考えましょう。   そのために、今何をなすべきか、日常を離れてゆっくり相談する機会を毎年持つという、そういう提案です。会場の皆様も、今拍手で、良い提案だと御賛同をいただいたと、このように思います。
何より、そうすればウラジオストクに毎年来ることができます。

会場においでの、ロシア経営者の皆様。皆様が渡ってこられた橋の建設には、日本の杭打ち機が使われました。この会場の電気は、日本のガスタービンが作り出しています。皆様一刻も早く、日本企業と働く経験を積み重ねてください。
日本企業の生産現場には、必ずと言っていいほど、生産ラインの効率を良くしようと打ち込む労働者の姿があります。ボトムからの改善を求める声が、管理者、設計者に届くようになっています。一歩一歩、現場の智慧を生かして不良品を減らし、安全性、効率を上げる「カイゼン」が、そうして定着しました。上意下達や階級差のない日本の労働現場で、初めて生まれた独創です。
また、競争的な市場では、価値はマーケットが決めるもので、企業の自由になりません。このとき、品質を落とさずに、競争の中、それでも利益を保って勝ち抜くにはどうすればいいでしょうか。
コストを下げて、粗利を確保するのだと割り切って、まさしく「カイゼン」の手法に拠りながら、工程で無駄を削り取ったのが日本企業です。
どこに珍しさがあるのかと言わないでください。日本企業がやって見せるまで、「安い、しかし良い」モノづくりなど、できないと信じ込まれてきました。ハーバード・ビジネススクールのマイケル・ポーター教授が、そう指摘しています。
多くの国々が、早く、この手法に習熟する中で、そのうねりは、まだロシアの地には到達していない。日本企業と深く付き合うことで起きる生産思想の革新を、ロシアはまだ経験していません。
プーチン大統領、目指しておられる生産業大国へ至る道には、実証済みの近道がある。日本企業と組むことだと、声を大にして申し上げたいと思います。
ウラジーミル、あなたと私には、この先、大きな課題が待ち受けています。
限りない可能性を秘めているはずの、重要な隣国同士であるロシアと日本が、今日に至るまで平和条約を締結していないのは、異常な事態だと言わざるを得ません。
私たちは、それぞれの歴史に対する立場、おのおのの国民世論、そして愛国心を背負って、この場に立っています。日本の指導者として、私は日本の立場の正しさを確信し、ウラジーミル、あなたはロシアの指導者として、ロシアの立場の正しさを確信しています。
しかしこのままでは、あと何十年も、同じ議論を続けることになってしまいます。それを放置していては、私も、あなたも、未来の世代に対してより良い可能性を残してやることはできません。
ウラジーミル、私たちの世代が、勇気を持って、責任を果たしていこうではありませんか。あらゆる困難を乗り越えて、日本とロシア、2つの国がその可能性を大きく開花させる世界を、次の世代の若い人たちに残していこうではありませんか。この70年続いた異常な事態に終止符を打ち、次の70年の、日露の新たな時代を、共に切り開いていこうではありませんか。
無限の可能性を秘めた二国間関係を未来に向けて切り開くため、私は、ウラジーミル、あなたと一緒に、力の限り、日本とロシアの関係を前進させていく覚悟であります。
御清聴ありがとうございました。

English

Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the 2nd Eastern Economic Forum

Saturday, September 3, 2016

[Provisional translation]

Mr. Kevin Rudd, thank you for your kind introduction. President Park Geun-hye, it is an honour to see you again. And most of all, President Vladimir Putin, I am truly delighted at this, my first opportunity to set foot in Vladivostok, in response to your gracious invitation.
ケヴィン・ラッドゥさん、貴方の丁寧な紹介に感謝致します。パク・クネ大統領、貴方に又会えて光栄です。とりわけ、ウラジーミル・プ一チン大統領、私は、貴方の親切な紹待に応じ、ここ、ウラジオストックに足を踏み入れる私の初めての機会を得て、本当に嬉しく思っております。

22:16 2016/10/11火

This time, of course I came here by airplane.

But this city has a port as its doorway, and it is often said that Vladivostok is even more stunning when seen from the sea. So, really, this is perhaps a city we should come visit by ship.

About a century ago, a visitor struck breathless at the scenery greeting him in the harbour penned the line, “One can scarcely conceive a more beautiful situation.” The writer was none other than the world-famous polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen.

There are some places I would really like to visit in this city.

I understand that if you head to Aleutskaya Street, you will find the house that was the birthplace of Yul Brynner, who won an Oscar for his work in “The King and I,” along with a statue memorializing him. I simply can’t miss out on a visit there.

And I have heard that Vasiliy Ochepkov, who, as President Putin knows very well, introduced Kodokan judo to Russia, instituted the first dojo -- that is, the first hall for practicing judo -- at Korabelnaya Street No. 21. I wonder if that building is also still with us today. I am saving all these sights for when I come again someday.

And I hope to make that “someday” a day in the not too distant future. Let me explain why later on in my remarks.

Every year in your annual address to the Federal Assembly, President Putin, you highlight the development of Russia’s Far East region as the most important factor for national development. By making Vladivostok a “free port” and setting it forth as a model, you hope to make other port cities into “free ports” as well.

I imagine you wish to restore the prestige Vladivostok enjoyed at one time as a truly international city.

That dream that President Putin holds is my dream as well. Mr. President, you are looking to make Vladivostok a gateway linking Eurasia and the Pacific, am I correct?

The Pacific Ocean is now poised to evolve into a free, fair, and open economic zone. The vast Eurasian land area lying beyond this city will provide further impetus to its dynamism. I am firmly convinced that the sparkle of Vladivostok will light up even the farthest reaches of the Pacific Ocean and give rise to enormous synergistic effects.

President Putin, when we met not long ago in Sochi, I presented you with an eight-bullet-point proposal in which I had narrowed down a list of fields where Japan can cooperate with Russia.

One of these was “creating cities that are clean and comfortable and easy to live and work in.” Am I right in saying there is no other city so suited as Vladivostok to serve as a model city for our two countries to carry this out?

Please do add Japan in to this task of cultivating Vladivostok to be a city convenient for its residents and brimming with appeal for its tourists, mixing modern motifs into the nostalgia-inducing pre-revolution architecture and the characteristic Soviet-era designs while taking full advantage of the unique beauty of the sea and the hills. I make this proposal in all earnestness. Let us make this a reality together, shall we not?

*****

While preparing for this trip, I had the opportunity to look at Russia’s demographic statistics, and I couldn't help but be surprised.

Although close to 23 million people were born in the decade beginning in 1976, the current population aged 10 to 19 now falls short of 14 million. It was as if the statistics showing the number of people born in the decade beginning in 1996 were telling the tale of the difficulties Russia experienced in the late 1990’s.

As a rare occurrence even globally, Russia has been achieving a steady rise in its average life expectancy as well as increases in its population. With an increasing number of school-age children and an insufficient number of schools as a result, the reality which has emerged is enviable from the Japanese standpoint.

However, the working-age population will decrease remarkably in the years to come, and there will be a shift in the burden, concentrated on the people who are now in that 10-to-19 age bracket.

Just as they are entering the prime of life, the burden of medical care costs for the elderly will weigh heavily upon them. Taking notice of that, we put forth our proposal of “lengthening the healthy life expectancy of the Russian public by preparing state-of-the-art facilities for health and medical care” as the first of the eight items.

The issues Japan faces are similar indeed. In Japan, where we face an increasingly aging society alongside a falling birth-rate, a burden will fall upon the medical care and the pension system. We must hammer out wide-ranging policies and measures so that the members of our greying generation maintain their health. Therefore the concerns President Putin harbours about demographics are the very same concerns that I myself have.

President Putin, I imagine you are encouraging Russia’s teenagers to work hard going forward without flinching, because there are so many people in the older generation. The necessary encouragement for Japan’s youth is in fact one and the same.

However, there is no quick-acting remedy for this issue. What political leaders can do is to think of the destiny of the nation always over a long scale of 20 or 30 years. Once we have bravely faced the issues and hammered out creative policies, it is simply a matter of working tirelessly to bring them into execution without fail.

In saying this, I imagine that President Park will also nod her head in agreement. What should we do in order to have the young generation think that although the future may not become better immediately, we can certainly do better if only we work hard? I believe we have this as a challenge and also a worry we all share in common.

*****

Ladies and gentlemen, there are only three means for bringing about economic growth. These are the renewal of capital stock, an increase in labour input, and gains in labour productivity. My economic policies known as “Abenomics” are now aiming to boost Japan’s growth by actively working on all three of these elements.

However, economists all agree in saying that what is more important than anything else for growth is the expectations of the public.

The basis for everything is people believing that tomorrow will be better than today.

For this reason, President Putin, first of all let you and me share in a strong conviction regarding the potential of the future that the closer cooperation between Japan and Russia will bring about.

The economies of Russia and Japan are not in rivalry. I am fully confident that ours is a relationship in which each complements the other in a magnificent way.

Let us envision a future in which we both grow, each providing stimulation to the other in both demand and supply aspects. And let us do everything necessary so that the people in both our countries entrust their bright futures to such a relationship.

For example, cooperation between small- and medium-sized enterprises is extremely promising. The development of energy resources and the expansion of their production capacity will be a prime example of creating a win-win situation.

Let us make the Far East Russia region a base for exports to Asia and the Pacific region while raising productivity by moving forward with the diversification of Russian industries and then taking full advantage of that. Shall we not move forward together in generating momentum for cooperation in advanced technologies and people-to-people exchanges -- in other words, in investing towards the future?

Given that, President Putin, I will present to you a new proposal. Let us meet once a year in Vladivostok to confirm with each other the state of progress of these eight points.

Let us occasionally enter the virgin taiga forest, get enveloped in the sunlight filtering through the trees that appeared in Akira Kurosawa’s Dersu Uzala, and together consider what kind of relations Japan and Russia must have 20 or 30 years into the future.

This is a proposal that every year we have an opportunity to move away from our daily obligations to have relaxed discussions about what we should do now to bring that about. Ladies and gentlemen in the audience, do you not think this is a good idea?

Most importantly, by doing so I will be able to come to Vladivostok every year.

*****

To the Russian executives here in the audience, let me tell you that Japanese pile drivers were used in constructing the bridge you crossed to be here today. And it is Japanese-made gas turbines producing the electricity used in this hall.

I hope that all of you accumulate many experiences working together with Japanese companies at the earliest possible time.

It is no exaggeration to say that invariably, the manufacturing worksites of Japanese companies are staffed by workers putting their heart and soul into improving the efficiency of the production line. Calls to improve the system from the bottom reach the managers and designers.

This is how “kaizen,” which uses the wisdom of the workplace to reduce the number of defective goods while increasing safety and efficiency step by step, came to take root. It is a kind of ingenuity first developed at Japan’s worksites, which are not authoritarian but egalitarian.

In addition, in competitive markets, prices are determined by the markets themselves, not freely decided by the companies. In such circumstances, without sacrificing product quality, what should be done amidst competition, in order to ensure a profit and emerge a winner?

It is Japanese companies that, truly grounded in the technique of “kaizen,” found a solution of lowering costs and ensuring gross margins and shaved waste off of production.

Please don’t ask what is so special about that. Until Japanese companies showed the way, manufacturing things that were “both cheap and well-made” was thoroughly believed to be impossible. Professor Michael Porter of Harvard Business School has pointed that out.

Despite a large number of countries mastering this technique early on, that surge has still not arrived in Russia. Russia has not yet experienced the innovation in production ideology that arises through interacting intensely with Japanese companies.

President Putin, the road to becoming the manufacturing power you are aiming at has a proven shortcut. And that is partnering with Japanese companies, I can proclaim emphatically.

*****

Vladimir, one big, big issue awaits you and me down the road.

I cannot help but say that it is an unnatural state of affairs that the important neighbors of Russia and Japan, which surely have unlimited potential, have to this day not yet concluded a peace treaty.

We stand here today shouldering our respective viewpoints on history, as well as our own particular public opinion and patriotic spirit. As the leader of Japan, I am firmly convinced of the correctness of the Japanese position, while you, Vladimir, as the leader of Russia, are entirely confident of the correctness of the Russian position.

Yet if we continue on like this, this very same discussion will continue for yet more decades to come. By leaving the situation as it is, neither you nor I will be able to leave better possibilities to future generations.

Vladimir, shall our generation not be the one to have the courage to fulfil our responsibilities? Shall our two countries, Japan and Russia, not overcome all manner of difficulties to leave to the young people of the next generation a world that makes those possibilities come into full bloom? Putting an end to the unnatural state of affairs that has continued these 70 years, shall we not together carve out a new era for Japan and Russia going forward?

Vladimir, in order to carve out towards the future bilateral relations overflowing with unlimited potential, I am resolved to putting forth all my strength to advance the relationship between Japan and Russia, together with you.

2016年10月10日月曜日

CNN(米国)への岸田外務大臣寄稿2

日本語が使いこなせない人は、私達の時代にも、使いこなせる人よりも沢山いました。
作文が上手な者は、学年604人中一人だけでした。
一年から三年まで1812人いましたが、おそらく私だけだったのでしょう。
岸田外務大臣のCNNへの寄稿は、作家に手伝わせています。
作家が満足な文章も書けない事など、珍しくもありません。
それを英訳など出来るハズもありません。
母国語が出来ない人に、外国語は出来ません。
私のブログを改竄し、私の翻訳文や、詩、その他を盗んだところで、貴方方に出来る事は、一つもありません。
外務省は、創価学会員と日本財団、東京財団、やくざの子孫、政治家、企業家子孫のほら穴です。


CNN(米国)への岸田外務大臣寄稿
(平成28年4月9日付)
「核兵器のない世界はまだ実現できる」

平成28年4月10日
英語版 (English)
メール

広島には、海と山に囲まれた美しい自然、豊かな文化と長い歴史があります。私の地元である広島は、原爆投下から蘇った「平和」と「希望」の象徴です。私自身、そして広島の人々にとって、軍縮・不拡散の問題は常に特別な意味を持ってきました。

ちょうど2週間前、「核兵器のない世界」の実現に向けた取組について議論するため、若者たちが広島に集い、私は彼らの意見に耳を傾けました。「被爆者の方々から平和のバトンを受け継ぎたい」、「世界のリーダー達に核兵器廃絶に向けて真剣に取り組んでほしい」、若者たちはこう述べました。

彼らの思いを胸に、議長として週末のG7外相会合を開催します。史上始めて被爆地広島で開催されるG7外相会合であり、軍縮・不拡散についてしっかりと取り上げたいと思います。

昨年のNPT運用検討会議以降、核兵器国と非核兵器国との対立が深まっており、残念ながら「核兵器のない世界」に向けた国際的な機運はしぼみつつあり、被爆地広島出身の外相として強い危機感を感じています。

これが我々の直面する現実であり、今週のG7広島外相会合では、核の問題を含む安全保障が重要な議題となります。

また、北朝鮮による1月の核実験及び2月、3月の弾道ミサイルの発射は、地域のみならず、国際社会共通の深刻な脅威です。核兵器国と非核兵器国の双方が含まれるG7として、広島の地から力強いメッセージを発出し、国際的な機運を再び盛り上げ、「核兵器のない世界」に向けた取組を再起動させたい、そのために共に「広島宣言」を発出できるよう議長として尽力します。

4月11日には、G7各外相が揃って広島平和記念資料館を訪問し、原爆死没者慰霊碑への献花を行います。世界の指導者に被爆の実相に触れてもらうことは、「核兵器のない世界」を目指すという国際的な機運を盛り上げる上で重要な一歩になると確信しています。

我々は、その他にも喫緊の課題に直面しています。今年に入ってからも、先月のブリュッセルにおける悲劇をはじめ、各国でテロ攻撃が頻発しています。テロ・暴力的過激主義が激化し、欧州や一部のアジア諸国にも地域的広がりを見せています。これは国際社会として取り組むべき課題です。無辜の市民の命を奪う卑劣なテロは、平和と繁栄という人類共通の価値への挑戦であり、日本は断固これを非難します。

また、深刻化する難民問題に対しても、その背景にある根本原因に中長期的に取り組み、暴力的過激主義を生み出さない寛容で安定した社会の構築に向けて取り組む必要があります。

G7は、国際秩序へのコミットメントを含む基本的な価値を共有しており、国際社会が直面する喫緊の課題への対応を主導すべきと考えます。広島においてジョン・ケリー米国務長官を含む各国の外相をお迎えし、これらの課題に対して率直な議論を行いたいと思います。

これらの脅威に対応していくためには、現実的な取組が必要です。G7各国がそれぞれ強みをいかした対策を行い、協働して取り組むべきです。その中で、日本としては、日本の強みを活かし、短期的な人道的な支援と中長期的な観点から開発協力を組み合わせて貢献していきたいと思います。

8年振りにアジアで開催されるG7外相会合であり、北朝鮮や海洋安全保障といったアジアの問題についてもしっかり取り上げ、G7としてゆるぎない対応を取りたいと思います。南シナ海等で見られる力による現状への変更の試みは、法の支配に基づく国際秩序への挑戦です。G7は、公海における航行・上空飛行の自由の確保や一方的な行動の自制、海賊対策を含む海上交通の安定確保に向けた取組の重要性といった認識を共有しており、適切なメッセージを発したいと思います。

被爆から70年を経て、広島は「平和」と「希望」の象徴となっています。その広島にG7各国の外相をお迎えし、平和、繁栄、未来への希望といったメッセージを共に発したいと思います。

Interviews & Articles

Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida's Article contributed to CNN
(April 9, 2016)
"We can still achieve a world without nuclear weapons"
April 10, 2016
Japanese
e-mail

広島には、海と山に囲まれた美しい自然、豊かな文化と長い歴史があります。私の地元である広島は、原爆投下から蘇った「平和」と「希望」の象徴です。私自身、そして広島の人々にとって、軍縮・不拡散の問題は常に特別な意味を持ってきました。外務省
The city of Hiroshima sits in a beautiful location, surrounded by sea and mountains. It has a rich culture and history, and has been a symbol of peace and hope since its recovery from the atomic bombing in 1945. It is also my hometown, and so the issue of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation has always had a special resonance for myself and others living here.

広島という都市は、海と山並に囲まれた美しい処です。そこは、豊かな文化と歴史に恵まれ、1945年の原子爆弾投下からその復興以来、平和と希望の象徴でした。そこは、私の故郷でもあり、であるからこそ、この地に住む私自ら、又、他の人々にとって、核軍縮や拡散防止の成果は、何時も、特別の意味合いを持ちます。成田
。

21:27 2016/10/09日

ちょうど2週間前、「核兵器のない世界」の実現に向けた取組について議論するため、若者たちが広島に集い、私は彼らの意見に耳を傾けました。「被爆者の方々から平和のバトンを受け継ぎたい」、「世界のリーダー達に核兵器廃絶に向けて真剣に取り組んでほしい」、若者たちはこう述べました。
外務省
Indeed, just two weeks ago, I listened to young people gathered in the city to talk about how young people might help make progress in achieving their wish for a world without nuclear
weapons. ''I would like to take over the baton of peace from atomic bomb survivors,'' one young person told me. ''I sincerely ask world leaders to make efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons,'' another said, hopefully.
実際、ほんの2週間前、私は、若い人々が、どのように核兵器無しで、・・・・・・・・・(英文ミスが多く訳せない)させるとよいかについて語り合う為に街に集められた若い人々に耳を傾けました。「私は、原爆生存者から平和のバトンを受け取りたいと願っています。」と一人の若い人は、私に話しました。「私は世界のリーダー達に核兵器を排除する努力をするよう誠心誠意お頼いしました。」ともう一人が、期待を込めて言いました。成田

21:06 2016/10/10月

This weekend, keeping the aspirations of those young people deep in my heart, I will host a meeting gathering G7 foreign ministers to Hiroshima for the first time in history, determined to discuss the issue thoroughly.

As Japan's foreign minister, and hailing from Hiroshima, I feel a great sense of urgency. Sadly, since last year's Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference, the rift between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states has grown deeper. The momentum toward a world free of nuclear weapons has withered.

That is the reality facing us as we gather this week in Hiroshima for the foreign minister's meeting, where security -- including nuclear issues -- will be a key focus of our discussions.

North Korea's nuclear test in January, and ballistic missile launches in February and March, pose a serious threat not only to the region, but also to the international community. As a forum that comprises both nuclear and non-nuclear states, the G7 is well-positioned to send a strong message from Hiroshima to help revitalize international momentum on this issue and relaunch the quest for a world free of nuclear weapons. As chair, I will do what I can to realize this vision, aiming at jointly announcing the Hiroshima Declaration at the G7.

On April 11, all of the G7 foreign ministers will visit the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and lay a wreath at the Memorial Cenotaph for the Atomic Bomb Victims. I believe that by inviting world leaders to see with their own eyes the reality of the atomic bombings, we will take an important step, one that can help gather global momentum for a world without nuclear weapons.

But we do also face other pressing issues that we must tackle. Terrorist attacks, such as the tragedy that took place in Brussels last month, are occurring across the world. The threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism has been intensifying and spreading across Europe and also parts of Asia. This demands an international response. Japan, for its part, resolutely condemns acts of terrorism, which claim innocent citizens and poses a serious threat to the universal values of peace and prosperity.

Meanwhile, the refugee crisis is growing more acute with each passing month. We need to tackle the underlying causes of both terrorism and the refugee crisis in the medium to long term if we are to build a tolerant and stable society that is resilient against violent extremism.

The G7 is based on key, shared fundamental values, including a commitment to maintain international order. It therefore makes sense for the organization to take a lead in addressing these urgent global challenges. I hope my counterparts, including U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, will be able to hold some much-needed and frank discussions on these security challenges when we meet in Hiroshima.

Clearly, though, meeting these threats will also require practical action, and G7 countries will need to work together based on their individual strengths. Japan, for example, will be well-placed to contribute to these efforts by combining short-term humanitarian support with mid- to long-term development cooperation.

In addition to the North Korea issue, as this is the first G7 meeting in Asia in eight years, we will discuss and formulate a firm response on another issue important to Asia today: maritime security. Attempts to change the status quo through force, as seen in areas including the South China Sea, are challenges to an international order based on the rule of law. I therefore hope we can develop a message based on a shared view among the G7 members on the importance of ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, while refraining from unilateral actions, and maintaining the stability of sea lanes through counter-piracy and other measures.

Seven decades after it was struck by an atom bomb, Hiroshima is a city of peace and hope. I am proud to welcome my G7 counterparts to Hiroshima, and believe their visit will help inspire us all to deliver a shared message of peace, prosperity and hope for the future of the world

2016年10月9日日曜日

CNN(米国)への岸田外務大臣寄稿1

CNN(米国)への岸田外務大臣寄稿
(平成28年4月9日付)
「核兵器のない世界はまだ実現できる」

平成28年4月10日
英語版 (English)
メール

広島には、海と山に囲まれた美しい自然、豊かな文化と長い歴史があります。私の地元である広島は、原爆投下から蘇った「平和」と「希望」の象徴です。私自身、そして広島の人々にとって、軍縮・不拡散の問題は常に特別な意味を持ってきました。

ちょうど2週間前、「核兵器のない世界」の実現に向けた取組について議論するため、若者たちが広島に集い、私は彼らの意見に耳を傾けました。「被爆者の方々から平和のバトンを受け継ぎたい」、「世界のリーダー達に核兵器廃絶に向けて真剣に取り組んでほしい」、若者たちはこう述べました。

彼らの思いを胸に、議長として週末のG7外相会合を開催します。史上始めて被爆地広島で開催されるG7外相会合であり、軍縮・不拡散についてしっかりと取り上げたいと思います。

昨年のNPT運用検討会議以降、核兵器国と非核兵器国との対立が深まっており、残念ながら「核兵器のない世界」に向けた国際的な機運はしぼみつつあり、被爆地広島出身の外相として強い危機感を感じています。

これが我々の直面する現実であり、今週のG7広島外相会合では、核の問題を含む安全保障が重要な議題となります。

また、北朝鮮による1月の核実験及び2月、3月の弾道ミサイルの発射は、地域のみならず、国際社会共通の深刻な脅威です。核兵器国と非核兵器国の双方が含まれるG7として、広島の地から力強いメッセージを発出し、国際的な機運を再び盛り上げ、「核兵器のない世界」に向けた取組を再起動させたい、そのために共に「広島宣言」を発出できるよう議長として尽力します。

4月11日には、G7各外相が揃って広島平和記念資料館を訪問し、原爆死没者慰霊碑への献花を行います。世界の指導者に被爆の実相に触れてもらうことは、「核兵器のない世界」を目指すという国際的な機運を盛り上げる上で重要な一歩になると確信しています。

我々は、その他にも喫緊の課題に直面しています。今年に入ってからも、先月のブリュッセルにおける悲劇をはじめ、各国でテロ攻撃が頻発しています。テロ・暴力的過激主義が激化し、欧州や一部のアジア諸国にも地域的広がりを見せています。これは国際社会として取り組むべき課題です。無辜の市民の命を奪う卑劣なテロは、平和と繁栄という人類共通の価値への挑戦であり、日本は断固これを非難します。

また、深刻化する難民問題に対しても、その背景にある根本原因に中長期的に取り組み、暴力的過激主義を生み出さない寛容で安定した社会の構築に向けて取り組む必要があります。

G7は、国際秩序へのコミットメントを含む基本的な価値を共有しており、国際社会が直面する喫緊の課題への対応を主導すべきと考えます。広島においてジョン・ケリー米国務長官を含む各国の外相をお迎えし、これらの課題に対して率直な議論を行いたいと思います。

これらの脅威に対応していくためには、現実的な取組が必要です。G7各国がそれぞれ強みをいかした対策を行い、協働して取り組むべきです。その中で、日本としては、日本の強みを活かし、短期的な人道的な支援と中長期的な観点から開発協力を組み合わせて貢献していきたいと思います。

8年振りにアジアで開催されるG7外相会合であり、北朝鮮や海洋安全保障といったアジアの問題についてもしっかり取り上げ、G7としてゆるぎない対応を取りたいと思います。南シナ海等で見られる力による現状への変更の試みは、法の支配に基づく国際秩序への挑戦です。G7は、公海における航行・上空飛行の自由の確保や一方的な行動の自制、海賊対策を含む海上交通の安定確保に向けた取組の重要性といった認識を共有しており、適切なメッセージを発したいと思います。

被爆から70年を経て、広島は「平和」と「希望」の象徴となっています。その広島にG7各国の外相をお迎えし、平和、繁栄、未来への希望といったメッセージを共に発したいと思います。

Interviews & Articles

Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida's Article contributed to CNN
(April 9, 2016)
"We can still achieve a world without nuclear weapons"
April 10, 2016
Japanese
e-mail

広島には、海と山に囲まれた美しい自然、豊かな文化と長い歴史があります。私の地元である広島は、原爆投下から蘇った「平和」と「希望」の象徴です。私自身、そして広島の人々にとって、軍縮・不拡散の問題は常に特別な意味を持ってきました。外務省
The city of Hiroshima sits in a beautiful location, surrounded by sea and mountains. It has a rich culture and history, and has been a symbol of peace and hope since its recovery from the atomic bombing in 1945. It is also my hometown, and so the issue of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation has always had a special resonance for myself and others living here.

広島という都市は、海と山並に囲まれた美しい処です。そこは、豊かな文化と歴史に恵まれ、1945年の原子爆弾投下からその復興以来、平和と希望の象徴でした。そこは、私の故郷でもあり、であるからこそ、この地に住む私自ら、又、他の人々にとって、核軍縮や拡散防止の成果は、何時も、特別の意味合いを持ちます。成田
。

21:27 2016/10/09日

Indeed, just two weeks ago, I listened to young people gathered in the city to talk about how they might help make progress in achieving their wish for a world without nuclear
weapons. ''I would like to take over the baton of peace from atomic bomb survivors,'' one young person told me. ''I sincerely ask world leaders to make efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons,'' another said, hopefully.

This weekend, keeping the aspirations of those young people deep in my heart, I will host a meeting gathering G7 foreign ministers to Hiroshima for the first time in history, determined to discuss the issue thoroughly.

As Japan's foreign minister, and hailing from Hiroshima, I feel a great sense of urgency. Sadly, since last year's Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference, the rift between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states has grown deeper. The momentum toward a world free of nuclear weapons has withered.

That is the reality facing us as we gather this week in Hiroshima for the foreign minister's meeting, where security -- including nuclear issues -- will be a key focus of our discussions.

North Korea's nuclear test in January, and ballistic missile launches in February and March, pose a serious threat not only to the region, but also to the international community. As a forum that comprises both nuclear and non-nuclear states, the G7 is well-positioned to send a strong message from Hiroshima to help revitalize international momentum on this issue and relaunch the quest for a world free of nuclear weapons. As chair, I will do what I can to realize this vision, aiming at jointly announcing the Hiroshima Declaration at the G7.

On April 11, all of the G7 foreign ministers will visit the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and lay a wreath at the Memorial Cenotaph for the Atomic Bomb Victims. I believe that by inviting world leaders to see with their own eyes the reality of the atomic bombings, we will take an important step, one that can help gather global momentum for a world without nuclear weapons.

But we do also face other pressing issues that we must tackle. Terrorist attacks, such as the tragedy that took place in Brussels last month, are occurring across the world. The threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism has been intensifying and spreading across Europe and also parts of Asia. This demands an international response. Japan, for its part, resolutely condemns acts of terrorism, which claim innocent citizens and poses a serious threat to the universal values of peace and prosperity.

Meanwhile, the refugee crisis is growing more acute with each passing month. We need to tackle the underlying causes of both terrorism and the refugee crisis in the medium to long term if we are to build a tolerant and stable society that is resilient against violent extremism.

The G7 is based on key, shared fundamental values, including a commitment to maintain international order. It therefore makes sense for the organization to take a lead in addressing these urgent global challenges. I hope my counterparts, including U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, will be able to hold some much-needed and frank discussions on these security challenges when we meet in Hiroshima.

Clearly, though, meeting these threats will also require practical action, and G7 countries will need to work together based on their individual strengths. Japan, for example, will be well-placed to contribute to these efforts by combining short-term humanitarian support with mid- to long-term development cooperation.

In addition to the North Korea issue, as this is the first G7 meeting in Asia in eight years, we will discuss and formulate a firm response on another issue important to Asia today: maritime security. Attempts to change the status quo through force, as seen in areas including the South China Sea, are challenges to an international order based on the rule of law. I therefore hope we can develop a message based on a shared view among the G7 members on the importance of ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, while refraining from unilateral actions, and maintaining the stability of sea lanes through counter-piracy and other measures.

Seven decades after it was struck by an atom bomb, Hiroshima is a city of peace and hope. I am proud to welcome my G7 counterparts to Hiroshima, and believe their visit will help inspire us all to deliver a shared message of peace, prosperity and hope for the future of the world

2016年10月7日金曜日

The latest from the Bank of Japan13/Ben Bernanke翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行(BOJ)の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行(BOJ)は、「2%の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行(BOJ)は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変更として、日本銀行(BOJ)は、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも(それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。)しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.
日本銀行の発表に対する市場の反応は、錯綜した。凡そ、発表は、政策骨子の変更に関してであり、se毎の政策姿勢の変更に関してではなかった。殊に、発表された10年国?利回りを目指す目標数値は、進行中の市場レイトゥに迫り、意義ある変更は、依然として、一0.1%の銀行の準備金に関するマイナス金利レイトゥを考慮に入れながら、日本銀行の機能の別の役割の為に為される事はなかった。

17:52 2016/09/27火

日本銀行(BOJ)は、しっかりとした新たな軽減措置を講じなかったとはいえ、私はあの発表は、総じて良い二ュ―スだと思う。日本のデフレイションの終焉というゴウルに合わせた再履行やそのゴウルを追い求める為の骨子の確立を包含する。日本銀行(BOJ)が明確に言及したように、喩え未来の政策減速が必要とされても、銀行は、短期利率か或いは、長期国債利回りのどちらかを今直ぐ切り下げられる。

22:43 2016/09/28水

最後まで遣り遂げる事は、実に重要である。日本は、かなりの前進を遂げた。が、その前進は、喩え、大衆が、そのインフレイション目標に対する日本銀行(BOJ)の公約を疑問に思っても、尚、失速しない。インフレイション・ターゲットゥの限度を超えそうな公約は、喩え日本銀行(BOJ)は、その闘いを止めるつもりだったという市場の推測を削ぐのを助けるにしても、建設的であるだろう。

22:07 2016/09/29木

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.
最も意外で興味深い発表の一つは、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りターゲットゥに対する決定だった。私は、長期レイトゥをタ一ゲットゥにする事に関する前の記事の中で言及した。連邦政府準備制度理事会は、日本銀行(BOJ)の新戦略にうってつけの合衆国の前例があり、第二次世界戦争中、又戦後直ちに戦争の資金調達の諸経費を抑制しようとして、長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにした。

22:24 2016/09/30金

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.
長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにする事は、量的緩和に密接に関係している。量的緩和方針の中で、中央銀行は、それが、買いたくさせるような多量の金融資産(この政府の債券のように)を市場に設定される為に、それらの資産価値(債券の場合、利回り)を離れて、指定する。

20:26 2016/10/01土

日本銀行が、現在行おうと計画しているように、長期利回りを抑制する事は、目標数量より寧ろ目標価格を定めるも同然である。

23:28 2016/10/02日

中央銀行は、債券を売買する気になる価格を公表する、が、数量は、事実上どれくらいの量を、市場参加者がその価格で売り捌くかを表す。

23:29 2016/10/03月

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.
それを考慮に入れると、日本銀行(BOJ)が、日本政府負債購入の為に、80兆円のターゲットゥを保ったという事には当惑させられた。この二つのターゲットゥの内の一つは、不要である。私は、日本銀行(BOJ)が、数量タ一ゲットゥ下落は、銀行が、金融緩和の予定を一定の割合で減らしていたと推測して(間違って)、市場参加者を主導しようとするという事と関連していると考える。

21:57 2016/10/04火

機会さえあれば、日本銀行(BOJ)は、その目新しいレイトゥの段階に固執するのを、当然の事と思い込んで、過剰な数量タ一ゲットゥは、より軟調に向かいと考えられるであろう。、意義が薄れるであろう。日本銀行(BOJ)の伝達は、従って、金融政策緩和の度合いのより良い指標として、日本政府の資産の内の国債の数量より寧ろ、日本政府負債の利回りを際立たせ始める。

21:41 2016/10/05水

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credibleーif market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for exampleーbecause then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.
日本銀行(BOJ)の長期レイトゥを釘付けする事は、かなりの危険を併う。とりわけ、一本の釘を守ろうとして、中央銀行は、国債の供給がタ一ゲットゥ レイトゥで手に入りさえすれば、買う義務を負わせて、その平衡の薄板のサイズを超える抑制を止める。

20:06 2016/10/06木

極端な場合、利回りを下げたままにして置こうとする中央銀行は、望ましい担保の殆ど、或いは、全てをそのものが所有している事に気付いてもいいのに。その危険は、特に喩えその釘が信用出来なくてもー喩え市場参加者が、似通った値で捨てられる釘を期待しても、例えば、その時出来るだけ速く売ろうとするようなしっかりした動機があるのだろうから。

21:04 2016/10/07金

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of
outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

2016年10月6日木曜日

The latest from the Bank of Japan/12Ben Bernanke翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行(BOJ)の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行(BOJ)は、「2%の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行(BOJ)は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変更として、日本銀行(BOJ)は、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも(それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。)しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.
日本銀行の発表に対する市場の反応は、錯綜した。凡そ、発表は、政策骨子の変更に関してであり、se毎の政策姿勢の変更に関してではなかった。殊に、発表された10年国?利回りを目指す目標数値は、進行中の市場レイトゥに迫り、意義ある変更は、依然として、一0.1%の銀行の準備金に関するマイナス金利レイトゥを考慮に入れながら、日本銀行の機能の別の役割の為に為される事はなかった。

17:52 2016/09/27火

日本銀行(BOJ)は、しっかりとした新たな軽減措置を講じなかったとはいえ、私はあの発表は、総じて良い二ュ―スだと思う。日本のデフレイションの終焉というゴウルに合わせた再履行やそのゴウルを追い求める為の骨子の確立を包含する。日本銀行(BOJ)が明確に言及したように、喩え未来の政策減速が必要とされても、銀行は、短期利率か或いは、長期国債利回りのどちらかを今直ぐ切り下げられる。

22:43 2016/09/28水

最後まで遣り遂げる事は、実に重要である。日本は、かなりの前進を遂げた。が、その前進は、喩え、大衆が、そのインフレイション目標に対する日本銀行(BOJ)の公約を疑問に思っても、尚、失速しない。インフレイション・ターゲットゥの限度を超えそうな公約は、喩え日本銀行(BOJ)は、その闘いを止めるつもりだったという市場の推測を削ぐのを助けるにしても、建設的であるだろう。

22:07 2016/09/29木

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.
最も意外で興味深い発表の一つは、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りターゲットゥに対する決定だった。私は、長期レイトゥをタ一ゲットゥにする事に関する前の記事の中で言及した。連邦政府準備制度理事会は、日本銀行(BOJ)の新戦略にうってつけの合衆国の前例があり、第二次世界戦争中、又戦後直ちに戦争の資金調達の諸経費を抑制しようとして、長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにした。

22:24 2016/09/30金

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.
長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにする事は、量的緩和に密接に関係している。量的緩和方針の中で、中央銀行は、それが、買いたくさせるような多量の金融資産(この政府の債券のように)を市場に設定される為に、それらの資産価値(債券の場合、利回り)を離れて、指定する。

20:26 2016/10/01土

日本銀行が、現在行おうと計画しているように、長期利回りを抑制する事は、目標数量より寧ろ目標価格を定めるも同然である。

23:28 2016/10/02日

中央銀行は、債券を売買する気になる価格を公表する、が、数量は、事実上どれくらいの量を、市場参加者がその価格で売り捌くかを表す。

23:29 2016/10/03月

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.
それを考慮に入れると、日本銀行(BOJ)が、日本政府負債購入の為に、80兆円のターゲットゥを保ったという事には当惑させられた。この二つのターゲットゥの内の一つは、不要である。私は、日本銀行(BOJ)が、数量タ一ゲットゥ下落は、銀行が、金融緩和の予定を一定の割合で減らしていたと推測して(間違って)、市場参加者を主導しようとするという事と関連していると考える。

21:57 2016/10/04火

機会さえあれば、日本銀行(BOJ)は、その目新しいレイトゥの段階に固執するのを、当然の事と思い込んで、過剰な数量タ一ゲットゥは、より軟調に向かいと考えられるであろう。、意義が薄れるであろう。日本銀行(BOJ)の伝達は、従って、金融政策緩和の度合いのより良い指標として、日本政府の資産の内の国債の数量より寧ろ、日本政府負債の利回りを際立たせ始める。

21:41 2016/10/05水

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.
日本銀行(BOJ)の長期レイトゥを釘付けする事は、かなりの危険を併う。とりわけ、一本の釘を守ろうとして、中央銀行は、国債の供給がタ一ゲットゥ レイトゥで手に入りさえすれば、買う義務を負わせて、その平衡の薄板のサイズを超える抑制を止める。

20:06 2016/10/06木


Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

2016年10月5日水曜日

The latest from the Bank of Japan11/Ben Bernanke翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行(BOJ)の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行(BOJ)は、「2%の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行(BOJ)は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変更として、日本銀行(BOJ)は、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも(それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。)しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.
日本銀行の発表に対する市場の反応は、錯綜した。凡そ、発表は、政策骨子の変更に関してであり、se毎の政策姿勢の変更に関してではなかった。殊に、発表された10年国?利回りを目指す目標数値は、進行中の市場レイトゥに迫り、意義ある変更は、依然として、一0.1%の銀行の準備金に関するマイナス金利レイトゥを考慮に入れながら、日本銀行の機能の別の役割の為に為される事はなかった。

17:52 2016/09/27火

日本銀行(BOJ)は、しっかりとした新たな軽減措置を講じなかったとはいえ、私はあの発表は、総じて良い二ュ―スだと思う。日本のデフレイションの終焉というゴウルに合わせた再履行やそのゴウルを追い求める為の骨子の確立を包含する。日本銀行(BOJ)が明確に言及したように、喩え未来の政策減速が必要とされても、銀行は、短期利率か或いは、長期国債利回りのどちらかを今直ぐ切り下げられる。

22:43 2016/09/28水

最後まで遣り遂げる事は、実に重要である。日本は、かなりの前進を遂げた。が、その前進は、喩え、大衆が、そのインフレイション目標に対する日本銀行(BOJ)の公約を疑問に思っても、尚、失速しない。インフレイション・ターゲットゥの限度を超えそうな公約は、喩え日本銀行(BOJ)は、その闘いを止めるつもりだったという市場の推測を削ぐのを助けるにしても、建設的であるだろう。

22:07 2016/09/29木

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.
最も意外で興味深い発表の一つは、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りターゲットゥに対する決定だった。私は、長期レイトゥをタ一ゲットゥにする事に関する前の記事の中で言及した。連邦政府準備制度理事会は、日本銀行(BOJ)の新戦略にうってつけの合衆国の前例があり、第二次世界戦争中、又戦後直ちに戦争の資金調達の諸経費を抑制しようとして、長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにした。

22:24 2016/09/30金

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.
長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにする事は、量的緩和に密接に関係している。量的緩和方針の中で、中央銀行は、それが、買いたくさせるような多量の金融資産(この政府の債券のように)を市場に設定される為に、それらの資産価値(債券の場合、利回り)を離れて、指定する。

20:26 2016/10/01土

日本銀行が、現在行おうと計画しているように、長期利回りを抑制する事は、目標数量より寧ろ目標価格を定めるも同然である。

23:28 2016/10/02日

中央銀行は、債券を売買する気になる価格を公表する、が、数量は、事実上どれくらいの量を、市場参加者がその価格で売り捌くかを表す。

23:29 2016/10/03月

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.
それを考慮に入れると、日本銀行(BOJ)が、日本政府負債購入の為に、80兆円のターゲットゥを保ったという事には当惑させられた。この二つのターゲットゥの内の一つは、不要である。私は、日本銀行(BOJ)が、数量タ一ゲットゥ下落は、銀行が、金融緩和の予定を一定の割合で減らしていたと推測して(間違って)、市場参加者を主導しようとするという事と関連していると考える。

21:57 2016/10/04火

機会さえあれば、日本銀行(BOJ)は、その目新しいレイトゥの段階に固執するのを、当然の事と思い込んで、過剰な数量タ一ゲットゥは、より軟調に向かいと考えられるであろう。、意義が薄れるであろう。日本銀行(BOJ)の伝達は、従って、金融政策緩和の度合いのより良い指標として、日本政府の資産の内の国債の数量より寧ろ、日本政府負債の利回りを際立たせ始める。

21:41 2016/10/05水

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

2016年10月4日火曜日

The latest from the Bank of Japan10/Ben Bernanke1翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行(BOJ)の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行(BOJ)は、「2%の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行(BOJ)は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変更として、日本銀行(BOJ)は、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも(それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。)しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.
日本銀行の発表に対する市場の反応は、錯綜した。凡そ、発表は、政策骨子の変更に関してであり、se毎の政策姿勢の変更に関してではなかった。殊に、発表された10年国?利回りを目指す目標数値は、進行中の市場レイトゥに迫り、意義ある変更は、依然として、一0.1%の銀行の準備金に関するマイナス金利レイトゥを考慮に入れながら、日本銀行の機能の別の役割の為に為される事はなかった。

17:52 2016/09/27火

日本銀行(BOJ)は、しっかりとした新たな軽減措置を講じなかったとはいえ、私はあの発表は、総じて良い二ュ―スだと思う。日本のデフレイションの終焉というゴウルに合わせた再履行やそのゴウルを追い求める為の骨子の確立を包含する。日本銀行(BOJ)が明確に言及したように、喩え未来の政策減速が必要とされても、銀行は、短期利率か或いは、長期国債利回りのどちらかを今直ぐ切り下げられる。

22:43 2016/09/28水

最後まで遣り遂げる事は、実に重要である。日本は、かなりの前進を遂げた。が、その前進は、喩え、大衆が、そのインフレイション目標に対する日本銀行(BOJ)の公約を疑問に思っても、尚、失速しない。インフレイション・ターゲットゥの限度を超えそうな公約は、喩え日本銀行(BOJ)は、その闘いを止めるつもりだったという市場の推測を削ぐのを助けるにしても、建設的であるだろう。

22:07 2016/09/29木

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.
最も意外で興味深い発表の一つは、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りターゲットゥに対する決定だった。私は、長期レイトゥをタ一ゲットゥにする事に関する前の記事の中で言及した。連邦政府準備制度理事会は、日本銀行(BOJ)の新戦略にうってつけの合衆国の前例があり、第二次世界戦争中、又戦後直ちに戦争の資金調達の諸経費を抑制しようとして、長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにした。

22:24 2016/09/30金

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.
長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにする事は、量的緩和に密接に関係している。量的緩和方針の中で、中央銀行は、それが、買いたくさせるような多量の金融資産(この政府の債券のように)を市場に設定される為に、それらの資産価値(債券の場合、利回り)を離れて、指定する。

20:26 2016/10/01土

日本銀行が、現在行おうと計画しているように、長期利回りを抑制する事は、目標数量より寧ろ目標価格を定めるも同然である。

23:28 2016/10/02日

中央銀行は、債券を売買する気になる価格を公表する、が、数量は、事実上どれくらいの量を、市場参加者がその価格で売り捌くかを表す。

23:29 2016/10/03月

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.
それを考慮に入れると、日本銀行(BOJ)が、日本政府負債購入の為に、80兆円のターゲットゥを保ったという事には当惑させられた。この二つのターゲットゥの内の一つは、不要である。私は、日本銀行(BOJ)が、数量タ一ゲットゥ下落は、銀行が、金融緩和の予定を一定の割合で減らしていたと推測して(間違って)、市場参加者を主導しようとするという事と関連していると考える。

21:57 2016/10/04火

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

2016年10月3日月曜日

The latest from the Bank of Japan9/Ben Bernanke翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行(BOJ)の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行(BOJ)は、「2%の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行(BOJ)は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変更として、日本銀行(BOJ)は、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも(それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。)しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.
日本銀行の発表に対する市場の反応は、錯綜した。凡そ、発表は、政策骨子の変更に関してであり、se毎の政策姿勢の変更に関してではなかった。殊に、発表された10年国?利回りを目指す目標数値は、進行中の市場レイトゥに迫り、意義ある変更は、依然として、一0.1%の銀行の準備金に関するマイナス金利レイトゥを考慮に入れながら、日本銀行の機能の別の役割の為に為される事はなかった。

17:52 2016/09/27火

日本銀行(BOJ)は、しっかりとした新たな軽減措置を講じなかったとはいえ、私はあの発表は、総じて良い二ュ―スだと思う。日本のデフレイションの終焉というゴウルに合わせた再履行やそのゴウルを追い求める為の骨子の確立を包含する。日本銀行(BOJ)が明確に言及したように、喩え未来の政策減速が必要とされても、銀行は、短期利率か或いは、長期国債利回りのどちらかを今直ぐ切り下げられる。

22:43 2016/09/28水

最後まで遣り遂げる事は、実に重要である。日本は、かなりの前進を遂げた。が、その前進は、喩え、大衆が、そのインフレイション目標に対する日本銀行(BOJ)の公約を疑問に思っても、尚、失速しない。インフレイション・ターゲットゥの限度を超えそうな公約は、喩え日本銀行(BOJ)は、その闘いを止めるつもりだったという市場の推測を削ぐのを助けるにしても、建設的であるだろう。

22:07 2016/09/29木

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.
最も意外で興味深い発表の一つは、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りターゲットゥに対する決定だった。私は、長期レイトゥをタ一ゲットゥにする事に関する前の記事の中で言及した。連邦政府準備制度理事会は、日本銀行(BOJ)の新戦略にうってつけの合衆国の前例があり、第二次世界戦争中、又戦後直ちに戦争の資金調達の諸経費を抑制しようとして、長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにした。

22:24 2016/09/30金

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.
長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにする事は、量的緩和に密接に関係している。量的緩和方針の中で、中央銀行は、それが、買いたくさせるような多量の金融資産(この政府の債券のように)を市場に設定される為に、それらの資産価値(債券の場合、利回り)を離れて、指定する。

20:26 2016/10/01土

日本銀行が、現在行おうと計画しているように、長期利回りを抑制する事は、目標数量より寧ろ目標価格を定めるも同然である。

23:28 2016/10/02日

中央銀行は、債券を売買する気になる価格を公表する、が、数量は、事実上どれくらいの量を、市場参加者がその価格で売り捌くかを表す。

23:29 2016/10/03月

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

2016年10月2日日曜日

The latest from the Bank of Japan8/Ben Bernanke翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行(BOJ)の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行(BOJ)は、「2%の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行(BOJ)は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変更として、日本銀行(BOJ)は、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも(それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。)しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.
日本銀行の発表に対する市場の反応は、錯綜した。凡そ、発表は、政策骨子の変更に関してであり、se毎の政策姿勢の変更に関してではなかった。殊に、発表された10年国?利回りを目指す目標数値は、進行中の市場レイトゥに迫り、意義ある変更は、依然として、一0.1%の銀行の準備金に関するマイナス金利レイトゥを考慮に入れながら、日本銀行の機能の別の役割の為に為される事はなかった。

17:52 2016/09/27火

日本銀行(BOJ)は、しっかりとした新たな軽減措置を講じなかったとはいえ、私はあの発表は、総じて良い二ュ―スだと思う。日本のデフレイションの終焉というゴウルに合わせた再履行やそのゴウルを追い求める為の骨子の確立を包含する。日本銀行(BOJ)が明確に言及したように、喩え未来の政策減速が必要とされても、銀行は、短期利率か或いは、長期国債利回りのどちらかを今直ぐ切り下げられる。

22:43 2016/09/28水

最後まで遣り遂げる事は、実に重要である。日本は、かなりの前進を遂げた。が、その前進は、喩え、大衆が、そのインフレイション目標に対する日本銀行(BOJ)の公約を疑問に思っても、尚、失速しない。インフレイション・ターゲットゥの限度を超えそうな公約は、喩え日本銀行(BOJ)は、その闘いを止めるつもりだったという市場の推測を削ぐのを助けるにしても、建設的であるだろう。

22:07 2016/09/29木

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.
最も意外で興味深い発表の一つは、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りターゲットゥに対する決定だった。私は、長期レイトゥをタ一ゲットゥにする事に関する前の記事の中で言及した。連邦政府準備制度理事会は、日本銀行(BOJ)の新戦略にうってつけの合衆国の前例があり、第二次世界戦争中、又戦後直ちに戦争の資金調達の諸経費を抑制しようとして、長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにした。

22:24 2016/09/30金

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.
長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにする事は、量的緩和に密接に関係している。量的緩和方針の中で、中央銀行は、それが、買いたくさせるような多量の金融資産(この政府の債券のように)を市場に設定される為に、それらの資産価値(債券の場合、利回り)を離れて、指定する。

20:26 2016/10/01土

日本銀行が、現在行おうと計画しているように、長期利回りを抑制する事は、目標数量より寧ろ目標価格を定めるも同然である。

23:28 2016/10/02日

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

2016年10月1日土曜日

The latest from the Bank of Japan/Ben Bernanke7翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行(BOJ)の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行(BOJ)は、「2%の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行(BOJ)は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変更として、日本銀行(BOJ)は、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも(それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。)しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.
日本銀行の発表に対する市場の反応は、錯綜した。凡そ、発表は、政策骨子の変更に関してであり、se毎の政策姿勢の変更に関してではなかった。殊に、発表された10年国?利回りを目指す目標数値は、進行中の市場レイトゥに迫り、意義ある変更は、依然として、一0.1%の銀行の準備金に関するマイナス金利レイトゥを考慮に入れながら、日本銀行の機能の別の役割の為に為される事はなかった。

17:52 2016/09/27火

日本銀行(BOJ)は、しっかりとした新たな軽減措置を講じなかったとはいえ、私はあの発表は、総じて良い二ュ―スだと思う。日本のデフレイションの終焉というゴウルに合わせた再履行やそのゴウルを追い求める為の骨子の確立を包含する。日本銀行(BOJ)が明確に言及したように、喩え未来の政策減速が必要とされても、銀行は、短期利率か或いは、長期国債利回りのどちらかを今直ぐ切り下げられる。

22:43 2016/09/28水

最後まで遣り遂げる事は、実に重要である。日本は、かなりの前進を遂げた。が、その前進は、喩え、大衆が、そのインフレイション目標に対する日本銀行(BOJ)の公約を疑問に思っても、尚、失速しない。インフレイション・ターゲットゥの限度を超えそうな公約は、喩え日本銀行(BOJ)は、その闘いを止めるつもりだったという市場の推測を削ぐのを助けるにしても、建設的であるだろう。

22:07 2016/09/29木

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.
最も意外で興味深い発表の一つは、10年日本政府負債(JGBs)利回りターゲットゥに対する決定だった。私は、長期レイトゥをタ一ゲットゥにする事に関する前の記事の中で言及した。連邦政府準備制度理事会は、日本銀行(BOJ)の新戦略にうってつけの合衆国の前例があり、第二次世界戦争中、又戦後直ちに戦争の資金調達の諸経費を抑制しようとして、長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにした。

22:24 2016/09/30金

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stnds ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.
長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにする事は、量的緩和に密接に関係している。量的緩和方針の中で、中央銀行は、それが、買いたくさせるような多量の金融資産(この政府の債券のように)を市場に設定される為に、それらの資産価値(債券の場合、利回り)を離れて、指定する。

20:26 2016/10/01土

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.