The latest from the Bank of Japan/Ben Bernanke6翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行（BOJ）の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行（BOJ）は、「２％の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行（BOJ）は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変更として、日本銀行（BOJ）は、10年日本政府負債（JGBs）利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも（それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。）しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.
日本銀行の発表に対する市場の反応は、錯綜した。凡そ、発表は、政策骨子の変更に関してであり、se毎の政策姿勢の変更に関してではなかった。殊に、発表された10年国?利回りを目指す目標数値は、進行中の市場レイトゥに迫り、意義ある変更は、依然として、一0.1％の銀行の準備金に関するマイナス金利レイトゥを考慮に入れながら、日本銀行の機能の別の役割の為に為される事はなかった。

17:52 2016/09/27火

日本銀行（BOJ）は、しっかりとした新たな軽減措置を講じなかったとはいえ、私はあの発表は、総じて良い二ュ―スだと思う。日本のデフレイションの終焉というゴウルに合わせた再履行やそのゴウルを追い求める為の骨子の確立を包含する。日本銀行（BOJ）が明確に言及したように、喩え未来の政策減速が必要とされても、銀行は、短期利率か或いは、長期国債利回りのどちらかを今直ぐ切り下げられる。

22:43 2016/09/28水

最後まで遣り遂げる事は、実に重要である。日本は、かなりの前進を遂げた。が、その前進は、喩え、大衆が、そのインフレイション目標に対する日本銀行（BOJ）の公約を疑問に思っても、尚、失速しない。インフレイション・ターゲットゥの限度を超えそうな公約は、喩え日本銀行（BOJ）は、その闘いを止めるつもりだったという市場の推測を削ぐのを助けるにしても、建設的であるだろう。

22:07 2016/09/29木

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.
最も意外で興味深い発表の一つは、10年日本政府負債（JGBs）利回りターゲットゥに対する決定だった。私は、長期レイトゥをタ一ゲットゥにする事に関する前の記事の中で言及した。連邦政府準備制度理事会は、日本銀行の新戦略にうってつけの合衆国の前例があり、第二次世界戦争中、又戦後直ちに戦争の資金調達の諸経費を抑制しようとして、長期利回りをタ一ゲットゥにした。

22:24 2016/09/30金

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

The latest from the Bank of Japan/Ben Bernanke5翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行（BOJ）の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行（BOJ）は、「２％の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行（BOJ）は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変更として、日本銀行（BOJ）は、10年日本政府負債（JGBs）利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも（それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。）しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.
日本銀行の発表に対する市場の反応は、錯綜した。凡そ、発表は、政策骨子の変更に関してであり、se毎の政策姿勢の変更に関してではなかった。殊に、発表された10年国?利回りを目指す目標数値は、進行中の市場レイトゥに迫り、意義ある変更は、依然として、一0.1％の銀行の準備金に関するマイナス金利レイトゥを考慮に入れながら、日本銀行の機能の別の役割の為に為される事はなかった。

17:52 2016/09/27火

日本銀行（BOJ）は、しっかりとした新たな軽減措置を講じなかったとはいえ、私はあの発表は、総じて良い二ュ―スだと思う。日本のデフレイションの終焉というゴウルに合わせた再履行やそのゴウルを追い求める為の骨子の確立を包含する。日本銀行（BOJ）が明確に言及したように、喩え未来の政策減速が必要とされても、銀行は、短期利率か或いは、長期国債利回りのどちらかを今直ぐ切り下げられる。

22:43 2016/09/28水

最後まで遣り遂げる事は、実に重要である。日本は、かなりの前進を遂げた。が、その前進は、喩え、大衆が、そのインフレイション目標に対する日本銀行（BOJ）の公約を疑問に思っても、尚、失速しない。インフレイション・ターゲットゥの限度を超えそうな公約は、喩え日本銀行（BOJ）は、その闘いを止めるつもりだったという市場の推測を削ぐのを助けるにしても、建設的であるだろう。

22:07 2016/09/29木

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

The latest from the Bank of Japan/Ben Bernanke4翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行（BOJ）の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行（BOJ）は、「２％の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行（BOJ）は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変更として、日本銀行（BOJ）は、10年日本政府負債（JGBs）利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも（それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。）しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.
日本銀行の発表に対する市場の反応は、錯綜した。凡そ、発表は、政策骨子の変更に関してであり、se毎の政策姿勢の変更に関してではなかった。殊に、発表された10年国?利回りを目指す目標数値は、進行中の市場レイトゥに迫り、意義ある変更は、依然として、一0.1％の銀行の準備金に関するマイナス金利レイトゥを考慮に入れながら、日本銀行の機能の別の役割の為に為される事はなかった。

17:52 2016/09/27火

日本銀行（BOJ）は、しっかりとした新たな軽減措置を講じなかったとはいえ、私はあの発表は、総じて良い二ュ―スだと思う。日本のデフレイションの終焉というゴウルに合わせた再履行やそのゴウルを追い求める為の骨子の確立を包含する。日本銀行（BOJ）が明確に言及したように、喩え未来の政策減速が必要とされても、銀行は、短期利率か或いは、長期国債利回りのどちらかを今直ぐ切り下げられる。

22:43 2016/09/28水

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

The latest from the Bank of Japan/Ben Bernanke3翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行（BOJ）の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行（BOJ）は、「２％の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行（BOJ）は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変更として、日本銀行（BOJ）は、10年日本政府負債（JGBs）利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも（それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。）しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.
日本銀行の発表に対する市場の反応は、錯綜した。凡そ、発表は、政策骨子の変更に関してであり、se毎の政策姿勢の変更に関してではなかった。殊に、発表された10年国儐利回りを目指す目標数値は、進行中の市場レイトゥに迫り、意義ある変更は、依然として、一0.1％の銀行の準備金に関するマイナス金利レイトゥを考慮に入れながら、日本銀行の機能の別の役割の為に為される事はなかった。

17:52 2016/09/27火

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

The latest from the Bank of Japan/Ben Bernanke2翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行（BOJ）の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行（BOJ）は、「２％の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行（BOJ）は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

次に、意義ある変化の中で、日本銀行（BOJ）は、10年日本政府負債（JGBs）利回りをターゲットゥにし始めようとしている。初めの内は約0%でも（それは、国債の為に目標額を調整している。）しかし、毎年、量的目標額、80兆円を買い続けるつもりであるという事を明らかにする事によって、メッセイジを台無しにした。

17:54 2016/09/26月

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

The latest from the Bank of Japan/Ben Bernanke1翻訳

The latest from the Bank of Japan
Ben S. Bernanke・
Wednesday, September 21, 2016

The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy announcement today had two main parts. First, the BOJ committed itself to continue expanding the monetary base until the inflation rate “exceeds the price stability target of 2 percent and stays above the target in a stable manner.” That is, the BOJ says it wants not only to reach its 2 percent inflation target but to overshoot it. Second, in a significant change, the BOJ will begin targeting the yield on ten-year Japanese government debt (JGBs), initially at about zero percent (that is, setting a target price for bonds). However, the Bank muddled that message by indicating that it also plans to continue to buy about 80 trillion yen in JGBs annually, a quantity target.
日本銀行（BOJ）の本日の政策発表には、二つの大切な要素があった。先ず、日本銀行（BOJ）は、「２％の物価安定目標を超え、安定的に目標を上回ったままである。」そのインフレイションの率まで、金融基盤を拡大し続ける為に現物を投入する。つまり、日本銀行（BOJ）は、そのインフレイション・ターゲットゥに届く事を欲するばかりでなく、それを上回る事を欲する。

22:17 2016/09/25日

Market reactions to the BOJ’s announcements have been mixed, likely because the announcements were about a change in policy framework, not a change in policy stance per se. In particular, the announced target for the ten-year JGB yield is close to its current market rate, and no significant changes were made to other parts of the BOJ’s program, including the negative interest rate on bank reserves, still at -0.1 percent. Although the BOJ did not take substantial new easing measures, I think the announcements are good news overall, since they include a recommitment to the goal of ending deflation in Japan and the establishment of a new framework for pursuing that goal. As the BOJ noted explicitly, the Bank will now be able to cut either the short-term rate or its target for the longer-term JGB yield if future policy easing is needed. The follow-through will indeed be crucial: Japan has made significant progress toward ending deflation, but that progress could still be lost if the public questions the BOJ’s commitment to its inflation objective. The commitment to overshoot the inflation target will be constructive if it helps to kill market speculation that the BOJ was contemplating abandoning its fight.

The most surprising, and interesting, part of the announcement was the decision to target the ten-year JGB yield. As I noted in a previous piece on targeting longer-term rates, there is a U.S. precedent for the BOJ’s new strategy: The Federal Reserve targeted long-term yields during and immediately after World War II, in an effort to hold down the costs of war finance.

Targeting a long-term yield is closely related to quantitative easing. In a quantitative easing program, the central bank specifies the quantity of financial assets (such as government bonds) that it plans to buy, leaving the price of those assets (the yield, in the case of bonds) to be set in the market. Pegging a long-term yield, as the BOJ now plans to do, amounts to setting a target price rather than a target quantity. The central bank posts the price at which it stands ready to buy or sell bonds, but the quantity actually purchased depends on how much market participants offer to sell at that price.

In that regard, it was puzzling that the BOJ retained its 80-trillion-yen quantity target for JGB purchases; one of these two targets is redundant. I presume that the BOJ was concerned that dropping the quantity target would lead market participants to infer (incorrectly) that the Bank was scaling back its program of monetary easing. Over time, assuming that the BOJ does adhere to its new rate peg, the redundant quantity target is likely to become softer and to recede in importance. The BOJ’s communication will accordingly begin to emphasize the yield on JGBs, rather than the quantity of bonds in the BOJ’s portfolio, as the better indicator of the degree of monetary policy ease.

Is the BOJ’s switch to a long-term rate peg a good idea? In general, pegging a long-term rate carries some risks. Notably, in defending a peg, a central bank gives up control over the size of its balance sheet, committing to buy whatever supply of bonds is forthcoming at the target rate. In the extreme case, a central bank trying to hold down yields could find itself owning most or all of the eligible securities. That risk is particularly acute if the peg is not credible?if market participants expect the peg to be abandoned in the near term, for example?because then bondholders will have a strong incentive to sell as quickly as possible.

Although the BOJ will want to monitor closely the effects of its announcement on the JGB market, in the Japanese context these risks are probably manageable. Importantly, the BOJ already owns a substantial portion of outstanding JGBs, and those bonds still in private hands are not very price-sensitive (because banks and other holders value JGBs for reasons other than yield). The result may be that the BOJ will be able to meet its yield target by buying considerably less than 80 trillion yen a year of JGBs going forward. Since constraints on the availability of JGBs were seen in many quarters as limiting the BOJ’s ability to maintain its easy policies beyond the next year or two, the new framework may be seen as more sustainable. Together with the commitment to overshoot the inflation target, that sustainability should enhance the long-term credibility of the program. Finally, the BOJ has been concerned about the effects of long-term yields on bank profitability and financial stability. From that perspective, a rate-pegging strategy brings the additional benefit of allowing the BOJ to mitigate the risk of large, destabilizing swings in those yields.

The BOJ’s announcement referred to “synergy effects” between Japanese monetary and fiscal policies, but in public statements Governor Kuroda has expressed his opposition to explicit monetary financing of government spending, so-called “helicopter money.” Exactly what constitutes helicopter money is a semantic debate, but a policy of keeping the government’s borrowing rate at zero indefinitely has some elements of monetary finance. (As noted, the Fed’s targeting policy during and after World War II was explicitly about reducing the costs of government borrowing.) The resemblance would become even more pronounced if the BOJ began targeting rates on very long JGBs (the Japanese government borrows at maturities out to forty years). I suspect that the BOJ is happy for now with “synergy,” as opposed to explicit fiscal-monetary cooperation. Whether such cooperation will emerge in the future will depend on whether the new framework proves powerful enough to decisively end deflation in Japan.

Ben Bernanke

Ben S. Bernanke is a Distinguished Fellow in Residence with the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. From February 2006 through January 2014, he was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Dr. Bernanke also served as Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the System's principal monetary policymaking body.

The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy provides independent, non-partisan analysis of fiscal and monetary policy issues in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of those policies and public understanding of them.

We’ll never forget 9/11. How should we remember Ground Zero?13翻訳

The Washington Post

We’ll never forget 9/11. How should we remember Ground Zero?

The tension between remembering and moving on.
By Lynne B. Sagalyn

September 9
Lynne B. Sagalyn?is a professor emerita of real estate at Columbia Business School and the author of "Power at Ground Zero: Politics, Money, and the Remaking of Lower Manhattan."

In the frequently contentious debate over Ground Zero, the Vesey Street stairs generated an especially heated conflict.
グラウンドゥ・ゼロに関する論争好きの何時もの議論の中で、ヴィージー・ストリートゥの階段は、殊の外激論を紹いた。

For hundreds of workers who managed to escape the World Trade Center complex on Sept. 11, 2001, the two flights of stairs were a cherished symbol. The stairs had led them from the site’s elevated plaza, away from the collapsing buildings and falling debris, to the relative safety of the streets beyond. In the words of one survivor, “They were the path to freedom.”
2011年9月に貿易センタ一共同ビルを何とか脱出出来た何百人もの勤め人にとって、階段の二機の飛行機は、心に秘められたシンボルだった。その階段は、敷地の高い広場から崩れ落ちて行くビルディングや落下している瓦礫から離れ、向こう側の通りの比較的安全な場所へと誘導した。 生存者の言葉に、「それが解放への細道だった。」

22:46 2016/09/11曰

For preservationists, the stairs were also important artifacts: the last above-ground remnants of the World Trade Center. “[They] will be the most dramatic original piece of the site that will have meaning to generations to come,” Richard Moe, then president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, said in 2006, when the group petitioned for the stairs to be kept in place.
歴史的建造物の保護論者にとって、その階段も又、大切な文化遺物で、世界貿易センターの決定的な地上の切れ端だった。「[それらは]、やがて来る世代への、意義ある場所の最もドゥラマティックな原型通りの一片であるに違いない。」リチャードゥ・モウ、歴史的保存の為のナショナル・トゥラストゥ会長は、2006年に語った。その団体は、その場所に階段を保存されるよう要請した。

17:01 2016/09/12月

Yet for developers and some neighborhood groups, the stairs were an eyesore― damaged not in the attack but in the subsequent cleanup ― that were impeding construction of a planned commercial tower and, with it, the revitalization of Lower Manhattan. “To the extent that this is going to delay rebuilding the World Trade Center site, I think New Yorkers have had enough,” John Dellaportas, chairman of the West Street Coalition, a neighborhood group, said five years after the attack .
依然として、開発者と一部住民グループにとって、その階段は、目障りだった―
痛んだだけでなく、その後の一掃で傷付いた―それは、計画された商業高層建築や、それに伴う、南部マンハッタンの復興を妨げていた。これは、世界貿易センターの敷地を再興する事を手間取らせようとしている。ニューヨークの人々は、十分満足していたと私は思う。ジョン
・デラポータス ウエストゥ・ストゥリート連合、住民グループは、攻撃後5年を経て語った。

21:18 2016/09/13火

Only after months of fighting did officials, preservationists and survivors reach an agreement. The 38 steps of the “survivors’ stairs ” were separated from the concrete structure supporting them and moved to the underground National September 11 Memorial Museum. Meanwhile, 2 World Trade Center was allowed to go forward unencumbered by emotion-laden symbolism. Today it is a skyscraper in progress, and the developer is looking for an anchor tenant. (News Corp. and 21st Century Fox had signed a lease but pulled out in January.)
戦闘の何ヶ月か後に限り公務に当たった、歴史的建造物保存論者や生存者らは、合意に達する。「生存者の階段」の38段は、それを支えている建物から切り離され、国立9月11日記念博物館を地下に移転した。それまで、２つの世界貿易センターは、感情が―重荷を背負わされた象徴主義によって、身軽になって将来へと進む事を許された。今日では、それは、進行中の超高層ビルであり、その開発者は、頼りになるテナントを探している。（ニュース・コープや21世紀フォックスは、仮契約したものの、1月に辞退した。）

21:35 2016/09/14水

[Tim Gunn: Designers refuse to make clothes to fit American women. It’s a disgrace.]

Again and again during the past 15 years, the same questions have arisen at Ground Zero: How do you resolve the tension between a mandate to remember and a mandate to revive? How do you memorialize, while at the same time creating a space where people want to work and live and visit?
過去15年間繰り返し、同じ疑問がグラウンドゥ・ゼロで持ち上がった。
忘れまいとする民意と復興させようとする民意の間の対立をどのように貴方方は解決するのか？同時に人々が、働き、暮らし、訪れたいと願う空間を創造している一方で、貴方方は、どのように追悼するのか？

21:58 2016/09/15木

Those twin mandates have compelled continuous accommodation. As a result, the memorial at the Trade Center site is distinctly different from those commemorating the losses at the Pentagon and in Shanksville, Pa., where remembrance is the sole focus. And the revitalization of Lower Manhattan is different than any development project the city, and quite possibly the country, has ever seen.
そうした似通った民意は、途切れのない調整を強いた。結果として、貿易センター跡地での記念館は、明らかにそれらペンタゴンの、又、シャンクスヴィレにおける喪失を追悼する事とは違う。ペンシルヴ二ア、そこでは、記憶が唯一焦点整合である。そして、マンハッタン南部の復興は、嘗て見た都市や、十分有り得る田舎を計画するどんな開発より変わっている。

21:42 2016/09/16金

Gov. George Pataki helped determine the contours of the New York memorial with his unexpected declaration, in June 2002, that “we will never build where the towers stood.”
知事ジョージ・パタキは、2002年7月に、思いがけない宣言で、ニューヨーク記念館の輪郭を決めるのを手伝った。「私達は、高層ビルが建っていた所に建てるつもりはない。」

22:57 2016/09/17土

Pataki also strongly endorsed the commercial mandate to rebuild 10 million square feet of office space and replace the high-grossing retail mall at the original World Trade Center. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, as owner of the land, and Larry Silverstein and his investment partnership, as holders of a 99-year lease on the site, were insistent on the full restoration of lost office space. The Lower Manhattan business community wanted the same.
パタキも又オフィス空間の1000万フィートゥ四方を再建しようとする、又、新しい世界貿易センターの小売の商店街を元の場所に置こうとする利益優先の民意を強力に支持した。ニューヨークとニュージャージーの港湾当局は、島の所有者やラリー・シルヴァースタインや彼の投資経営事業として、その跡地の99年リース保持者として、失われたオフィス空間の完全な復元を強く主張した。南部マンハッタンの事業集団も同じ事を望んだ。

22:00 2016/09/18日

But exactly where commercial development should take place, and what should be considered hallowed ground, proved difficult to settle. Even once the idea took hold that the footprints of the twin towers should be preserved, there was disagreement on how to define the footprints and what preserving them meant.
何れにせよ、当に、何処で商業開発が列に加わるべきか、神聖化された土地をどのくらい考慮されるべきか、解決するのは容易ではないと証明した。喩え一旦考えがトゥイン・タワーの足跡は、保存されるべきであるという事になっても、足跡をどのように定義するか、それらを保存する事にどんな意味があったのかに関する不合意があった。

22:34 2016/09/19月

For example, the first set of plans prepared by the Port Authority proposed putting bus garages (necessary to accommodate the millions of people expected to visit the memorial each year) underground in the vicinity of where the towers used to be. But hat proved to be untenable. Although the towers had been built on a concrete slab, many family members objected to any non-memorial construction below ground level, all the way down to bedrock. The distinction between the symbolic and the literal did not hold meaning, especially for families who never received the remains of those they lost on 9/11. (Some 1,115 victims were never found, and a repository containing 7,930 unidentified bone fragments and other remains is maintained by the city’s chief medical examiner within the 9/11 museum.) Ultimately, officials expanded the area for rebuilding by acquiring two blocks south of the Trade Center. This accommodated the Port Authority’s infrastructure and satisfied family members.
例えば、港湾当局によって用意された当初の計画一式は、高層ビルがあった場所の周辺の地下をバスの車庫にする事を提案した。何百万もの人々が毎年記念館を訪れるよう願った。が、それは支持されないと判った。多くのファミリーメンバーが、地上階の下、岩床に向かって下る全ての道に、どのような記念物もない建物に異議を唱えた。

22:44 2016/09/20火

象徴と実際との相違に意味はなかった。特に、9/11に失ったそれらの中の遺品を受け取った事が一度もない家族にとって（約1115人の犠牲者は見付けられる事もなく、7930人収容している保管場所は、骨の断片を特定出来ず、9/11博物館内部で市の主だった医療監察官によって他の遺品は保守管理される。

22:44 2016/09/2i水

結局、役人達は、貿易センターのトゥーブロックを取得する事によって、再建の区域を拡張した。これは、港湾当局者の基本的施設に適応し、その上、ファミリーメンバーを満足させた。

22:44 2016/09/22木

A jury selected the memorial design by architect Michael Arad and landscape architect Peter Walker for its “powerful, yet simple articulation of the footprints of the Twin Towers.” Opened to the public on the 10th anniversary of the attacks, the memorial features two voids that borrow their dimensions from the destroyed towers. Each void is framed by walls of water that cascade into pools 30 feet below street level, vanishing into nowhere, seemingly never to fill up. Bronze panels contain the names of those killed on Sept. 11, 2001, and in the first World Trade Center attack, on Feb. 26, 1993. The starkness is softened by a grove of 400 swamp white oak trees. The companion museum, completed in 2014 , is beneath the memorial plaza.
或る倍審員は、「トゥインタワ一の足跡のそのパワフルながら分かり易い歯切れ故に、建築家ミカエル・アラッドゥや風致的都市計画技師ピーター・ウォーカーによる追悼デザインを選んだ。攻撃の10周年を記念して一般公開され、その記念館は、破壊されたタワーからその広さを借りる二つの欠落を目立たせる。それぞれの欠落は、通りの高さの下30フィートゥ、プールに滝のように流れ込む壁で囲まれている。ブロンズのパネルには、その2001年9月11日や1993年2月26日に最初の世界貿易センター攻撃で殺された者の名前を載せてある。荒廃は、白い樫の木に埋め尽くされる400もの木立で和らげられる。片方の博物館は、2014年に完成し、メモリアル・プラザの下にある。

23:15 2016/09/23金

[How the careless errors of credit reporting agencies are ruining people’s lives]

The commitment to the towers’ footprints presented planners with another sensitive issue: how to balance retail and reverence. Shops could not be too close to the footprints, too close to commemoration. The original master plan separated them by siting the memorial 30 feet below ground and incorporating buffer elements: cultural buildings on the north and east sides. However, when the memorial was elevated to ground level, these elements disappeared. Today, the pavilion entrance to the museum, situated between the two pools, helps in the separation. But at ground level, the visual connection between remembrance and commerce remains. Below ground, these two abut, but none of the commercial spaces have access to or visibility from the museum.

The tension inherent in the dual mandate flared once again with the opening of the museum’s gift shop, which the father of one victim called “crass commercialism on a literally sacred site.”

Another issue that has exposed tensions is culture. With the idea that Ground Zero should be a “living memorial,” planners intended spaces for the arts to help infuse the redevelopment with energy and life. But a small subset of 9/11 family members resisted anything that might interfere with the memorialization of their loved ones. The arts spaces were competition ? for public attention, donations, size and pride of place at Ground Zero. And so the families sought to disrupt the planned selection of cultural groups and successfully petitioned to reduce the scale of cultural buildings.

The victims’ families, with their unassailable emotional claim, commanded singular standing whenever they put forth deeply felt desires for specific forms of remembrance or objections to specific plans for Ground Zero. They were a political constituency, and it was very hard for any politician to push against their opposition. But once most issues relating to remembrance were settled, and the focus shifted to commercial arrangements, the power of the activist families dissipated.

Since 2011, a new place has been materializing, a place that balances remembrance of the past with optimism for the future. The many goals officials and development executives set out to achieve have been cohering. One World Trade Center anchors the skyline of Lower Manhattan, and two other commercial towers have been attracting tenants. The World Trade Center transportation hub, with its distinctive, avian-like Oculus structure, is now populated with retail stores. The eight-acre memorial quadrant, with its 400 trees, is becoming more of a park day by day ? New Yorkers who are used to small, tight spaces are reveling in its openness. The business community downtown has been cheering the long-sought-after growth that promises to accompany the thousands of new office workers, tourists and residents.

[How the government could resist President Trump’s orders]

Rebuilding Ground Zero, “a place made sacred through tragic loss,” as the memorial’s president has said, has been a perilous but essential ambition. Remembrance without rebuilding would have constituted only partial healing of the wound to New York and the nation left by the 9/11 attacks. Only the dual achievement would constitute success in the eyes of New Yorkers, the nation and the world.

That New York succeeded by the 15th anniversary of 9/11, despite a process beset by passionate controversies, political disputes, personal animosities, sensitive preservation issues, broken deadlines, intense debates about developer subsidies and quarrelsome cost overruns, has surprised many who doubted that the years of chaos could yield anything of lasting value.

It is no longer Ground Zero, though the moniker for the Trade Center site is hard to let go.

We’ll never forget 9/11. How should we remember Ground Zero?12翻訳

The Washington Post

We’ll never forget 9/11. How should we remember Ground Zero?

The tension between remembering and moving on.
By Lynne B. Sagalyn

September 9
Lynne B. Sagalyn?is a professor emerita of real estate at Columbia Business School and the author of "Power at Ground Zero: Politics, Money, and the Remaking of Lower Manhattan."

In the frequently contentious debate over Ground Zero, the Vesey Street stairs generated an especially heated conflict.
グラウンドゥ・ゼロに関する論争好きの何時もの議論の中で、ヴィージー・ストリートゥの階段は、殊の外激論を紹いた。

For hundreds of workers who managed to escape the World Trade Center complex on Sept. 11, 2001, the two flights of stairs were a cherished symbol. The stairs had led them from the site’s elevated plaza, away from the collapsing buildings and falling debris, to the relative safety of the streets beyond. In the words of one survivor, “They were the path to freedom.”
2011年9月に貿易センタ一共同ビルを何とか脱出出来た何百人もの勤め人にとって、階段の二機の飛行機は、心に秘められたシンボルだった。その階段は、敷地の高い広場から崩れ落ちて行くビルディングや落下している瓦礫から離れ、向こう側の通りの比較的安全な場所へと誘導した。 生存者の言葉に、「それが解放への細道だった。」

22:46 2016/09/11曰

For preservationists, the stairs were also important artifacts: the last above-ground remnants of the World Trade Center. “[They] will be the most dramatic original piece of the site that will have meaning to generations to come,” Richard Moe, then president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, said in 2006, when the group petitioned for the stairs to be kept in place.
歴史的建造物の保護論者にとって、その階段も又、大切な文化遺物で、世界貿易センターの決定的な地上の切れ端だった。「[それらは]、やがて来る世代への、意義ある場所の最もドゥラマティックな原型通りの一片であるに違いない。」リチャードゥ・モウ、歴史的保存の為のナショナル・トゥラストゥ会長は、2006年に語った。その団体は、その場所に階段を保存されるよう要請した。

17:01 2016/09/12月

Yet for developers and some neighborhood groups, the stairs were an eyesore― damaged not in the attack but in the subsequent cleanup ― that were impeding construction of a planned commercial tower and, with it, the revitalization of Lower Manhattan. “To the extent that this is going to delay rebuilding the World Trade Center site, I think New Yorkers have had enough,” John Dellaportas, chairman of the West Street Coalition, a neighborhood group, said five years after the attack .
依然として、開発者と一部住民グループにとって、その階段は、目障りだった―
痛んだだけでなく、その後の一掃で傷付いた―それは、計画された商業高層建築や、それに伴う、南部マンハッタンの復興を妨げていた。これは、世界貿易センターの敷地を再興する事を手間取らせようとしている。ニューヨークの人々は、十分満足していたと私は思う。ジョン
・デラポータス ウエストゥ・ストゥリート連合、住民グループは、攻撃後5年を経て語った。

21:18 2016/09/13火

Only after months of fighting did officials, preservationists and survivors reach an agreement. The 38 steps of the “survivors’ stairs ” were separated from the concrete structure supporting them and moved to the underground National September 11 Memorial Museum. Meanwhile, 2 World Trade Center was allowed to go forward unencumbered by emotion-laden symbolism. Today it is a skyscraper in progress, and the developer is looking for an anchor tenant. (News Corp. and 21st Century Fox had signed a lease but pulled out in January.)
戦闘の何ヶ月か後に限り公務に当たった、歴史的建造物保存論者や生存者らは、合意に達する。「生存者の階段」の38段は、それを支えている建物から切り離され、国立9月11日記念博物館を地下に移転した。それまで、２つの世界貿易センターは、感情が―重荷を背負わされた象徴主義によって、身軽になって将来へと進む事を許された。今日では、それは、進行中の超高層ビルであり、その開発者は、頼りになるテナントを探している。（ニュース・コープや21世紀フォックスは、仮契約したものの、1月に辞退した。）

21:35 2016/09/14水

[Tim Gunn: Designers refuse to make clothes to fit American women. It’s a disgrace.]

Again and again during the past 15 years, the same questions have arisen at Ground Zero: How do you resolve the tension between a mandate to remember and a mandate to revive? How do you memorialize, while at the same time creating a space where people want to work and live and visit?
過去15年間繰り返し、同じ疑問がグラウンドゥ・ゼロで持ち上がった。
忘れまいとする民意と復興させようとする民意の間の対立をどのように貴方方は解決するのか？同時に人々が、働き、暮らし、訪れたいと願う空間を創造している一方で、貴方方は、どのように追悼するのか？

21:58 2016/09/15木

Those twin mandates have compelled continuous accommodation. As a result, the memorial at the Trade Center site is distinctly different from those commemorating the losses at the Pentagon and in Shanksville, Pa., where remembrance is the sole focus. And the revitalization of Lower Manhattan is different than any development project the city, and quite possibly the country, has ever seen.
そうした似通った民意は、途切れのない調整を強いた。結果として、貿易センター跡地での記念館は、明らかにそれらペンタゴンの、又、シャンクスヴィレにおける喪失を追悼する事とは違う。ペンシルヴ二ア、そこでは、記憶が唯一焦点整合である。そして、マンハッタン南部の復興は、嘗て見た都市や、十分有り得る田舎を計画するどんな開発より変わっている。

21:42 2016/09/16金

Gov. George Pataki helped determine the contours of the New York memorial with his unexpected declaration, in June 2002, that “we will never build where the towers stood.”
知事ジョージ・パタキは、2002年7月に、思いがけない宣言で、ニューヨーク記念館の輪郭を決めるのを手伝った。「私達は、高層ビルが建っていた所に建てるつもりはない。」

22:57 2016/09/17土

Pataki also strongly endorsed the commercial mandate to rebuild 10 million square feet of office space and replace the high-grossing retail mall at the original World Trade Center. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, as owner of the land, and Larry Silverstein and his investment partnership, as holders of a 99-year lease on the site, were insistent on the full restoration of lost office space. The Lower Manhattan business community wanted the same.
パタキも又オフィス空間の1000万フィートゥ四方を再建しようとする、又、新しい世界貿易センターの小売の商店街を元の場所に置こうとする利益優先の民意を強力に支持した。ニューヨークとニュージャージーの港湾当局は、島の所有者やラリー・シルヴァースタインや彼の投資経営事業として、その跡地の99年リース保持者として、失われたオフィス空間の完全な復元を強く主張した。南部マンハッタンの事業集団も同じ事を望んだ。

22:00 2016/09/18日

But exactly where commercial development should take place, and what should be considered hallowed ground, proved difficult to settle. Even once the idea took hold that the footprints of the twin towers should be preserved, there was disagreement on how to define the footprints and what preserving them meant.
何れにせよ、当に、何処で商業開発が列に加わるべきか、神聖化された土地をどのくらい考慮されるべきか、解決するのは容易ではないと証明した。喩え一旦考えがトゥイン・タワーの足跡は、保存されるべきであるという事になっても、足跡をどのように定義するか、それらを保存する事にどんな意味があったのかに関する不合意があった。

22:34 2016/09/19月

For example, the first set of plans prepared by the Port Authority proposed putting bus garages (necessary to accommodate the millions of people expected to visit the memorial each year) underground in the vicinity of where the towers used to be. But hat proved to be untenable. Although the towers had been built on a concrete slab, many family members objected to any non-memorial construction below ground level, all the way down to bedrock. The distinction between the symbolic and the literal did not hold meaning, especially for families who never received the remains of those they lost on 9/11. (Some 1,115 victims were never found, and a repository containing 7,930 unidentified bone fragments and other remains is maintained by the city’s chief medical examiner within the 9/11 museum.) Ultimately, officials expanded the area for rebuilding by acquiring two blocks south of the Trade Center. This accommodated the Port Authority’s infrastructure and satisfied family members.
例えば、港湾当局によって用意された当初の計画一式は、高層ビルがあった場所の周辺の地下をバスの車庫にする事を提案した。何百万もの人々が毎年記念館を訪れるよう願った。が、それは支持されないと判った。多くのファミリーメンバーが、地上階の下、岩床に向かって下る全ての道に、どのような記念物もない建物に異議を唱えた。

22:44 2016/09/20火

象徴と実際との相違に意味はなかった。特に、9/11に失ったそれらの中の遺品を受け取った事が一度もない家族にとって（約1115人の犠牲者は見付けられる事もなく、7930人収容している保管場所は、骨の断片を特定出来ず、9/11博物館内部で市の主だった医療監察官によって他の遺品は保守管理される。

22:44 2016/09/2i水

結局、役人達は、貿易センターのトゥーブロックを取得する事によって、再建の区域を拡張した。これは、港湾当局者の基本的施設に適応し、その上、ファミリーメンバーを満足させた。

22:44 2016/09/22木

A jury selected the memorial design by architect Michael Arad and landscape architect Peter Walker for its “powerful, yet simple articulation of the footprints of the Twin Towers.” Opened to the public on the 10th anniversary of the attacks, the memorial features two voids that borrow their dimensions from the destroyed towers. Each void is framed by walls of water that cascade into pools 30 feet below street level, vanishing into nowhere, seemingly never to fill up. Bronze panels contain the names of those killed on Sept. 11, 2001, and in the first World Trade Center attack, on Feb. 26, 1993. The starkness is softened by a grove of 400 swamp white oak trees. The companion museum, completed in 2014 , is beneath the memorial plaza.
或る倍審員は、「トゥインタワ一の足跡のそのパワフルながら分かり易い歯切れ故に、建築家ミカエル・アラッドゥや風致的都市計画技師ピーター・ウォーカーによる追悼デザインを選んだ。攻撃の10周年を記念して一般公開され、その記念館は、破壊されたタワーからその広さを借りる二つの欠落を目立たせる。

23:15 2016/09/23金

[How the careless errors of credit reporting agencies are ruining people’s lives]

The commitment to the towers’ footprints presented planners with another sensitive issue: how to balance retail and reverence. Shops could not be too close to the footprints, too close to commemoration. The original master plan separated them by siting the memorial 30 feet below ground and incorporating buffer elements: cultural buildings on the north and east sides. However, when the memorial was elevated to ground level, these elements disappeared. Today, the pavilion entrance to the museum, situated between the two pools, helps in the separation. But at ground level, the visual connection between remembrance and commerce remains. Below ground, these two abut, but none of the commercial spaces have access to or visibility from the museum.

The tension inherent in the dual mandate flared once again with the opening of the museum’s gift shop, which the father of one victim called “crass commercialism on a literally sacred site.”

Another issue that has exposed tensions is culture. With the idea that Ground Zero should be a “living memorial,” planners intended spaces for the arts to help infuse the redevelopment with energy and life. But a small subset of 9/11 family members resisted anything that might interfere with the memorialization of their loved ones. The arts spaces were competition ? for public attention, donations, size and pride of place at Ground Zero. And so the families sought to disrupt the planned selection of cultural groups and successfully petitioned to reduce the scale of cultural buildings.

The victims’ families, with their unassailable emotional claim, commanded singular standing whenever they put forth deeply felt desires for specific forms of remembrance or objections to specific plans for Ground Zero. They were a political constituency, and it was very hard for any politician to push against their opposition. But once most issues relating to remembrance were settled, and the focus shifted to commercial arrangements, the power of the activist families dissipated.

Since 2011, a new place has been materializing, a place that balances remembrance of the past with optimism for the future. The many goals officials and development executives set out to achieve have been cohering. One World Trade Center anchors the skyline of Lower Manhattan, and two other commercial towers have been attracting tenants. The World Trade Center transportation hub, with its distinctive, avian-like Oculus structure, is now populated with retail stores. The eight-acre memorial quadrant, with its 400 trees, is becoming more of a park day by day ? New Yorkers who are used to small, tight spaces are reveling in its openness. The business community downtown has been cheering the long-sought-after growth that promises to accompany the thousands of new office workers, tourists and residents.

[How the government could resist President Trump’s orders]

Rebuilding Ground Zero, “a place made sacred through tragic loss,” as the memorial’s president has said, has been a perilous but essential ambition. Remembrance without rebuilding would have constituted only partial healing of the wound to New York and the nation left by the 9/11 attacks. Only the dual achievement would constitute success in the eyes of New Yorkers, the nation and the world.

That New York succeeded by the 15th anniversary of 9/11, despite a process beset by passionate controversies, political disputes, personal animosities, sensitive preservation issues, broken deadlines, intense debates about developer subsidies and quarrelsome cost overruns, has surprised many who doubted that the years of chaos could yield anything of lasting value.

It is no longer Ground Zero, though the moniker for the Trade Center site is hard to let go.

We’ll never forget 9/11. How should we remember Ground Zero?11翻訳

The Washington Post

We’ll never forget 9/11. How should we remember Ground Zero?

The tension between remembering and moving on.
By Lynne B. Sagalyn

September 9
Lynne B. Sagalyn?is a professor emerita of real estate at Columbia Business School and the author of "Power at Ground Zero: Politics, Money, and the Remaking of Lower Manhattan."

In the frequently contentious debate over Ground Zero, the Vesey Street stairs generated an especially heated conflict.
グラウンドゥ・ゼロに関する論争好きの何時もの議論の中で、ヴィージー・ストリートゥの階段は、殊の外激論を紹いた。

For hundreds of workers who managed to escape the World Trade Center complex on Sept. 11, 2001, the two flights of stairs were a cherished symbol. The stairs had led them from the site’s elevated plaza, away from the collapsing buildings and falling debris, to the relative safety of the streets beyond. In the words of one survivor, “They were the path to freedom.”
2011年9月に貿易センタ一共同ビルを何とか脱出出来た何百人もの勤め人にとって、階段の二機の飛行機は、心に秘められたシンボルだった。その階段は、敷地の高い広場から崩れ落ちて行くビルディングや落下している瓦礫から離れ、向こう側の通りの比較的安全な場所へと誘導した。 生存者の言葉に、「それが解放への細道だった。」

22:46 2016/09/11曰

For preservationists, the stairs were also important artifacts: the last above-ground remnants of the World Trade Center. “[They] will be the most dramatic original piece of the site that will have meaning to generations to come,” Richard Moe, then president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, said in 2006, when the group petitioned for the stairs to be kept in place.
歴史的建造物の保護論者にとって、その階段も又、大切な文化遺物で、世界貿易センターの決定的な地上の切れ端だった。「[それらは]、やがて来る世代への、意義ある場所の最もドゥラマティックな原型通りの一片であるに違いない。」リチャードゥ・モウ、歴史的保存の為のナショナル・トゥラストゥ会長は、2006年に語った。その団体は、その場所に階段を保存されるよう要請した。

17:01 2016/09/12月

Yet for developers and some neighborhood groups, the stairs were an eyesore― damaged not in the attack but in the subsequent cleanup ― that were impeding construction of a planned commercial tower and, with it, the revitalization of Lower Manhattan. “To the extent that this is going to delay rebuilding the World Trade Center site, I think New Yorkers have had enough,” John Dellaportas, chairman of the West Street Coalition, a neighborhood group, said five years after the attack .
依然として、開発者と一部住民グループにとって、その階段は、目障りだった―
痛んだだけでなく、その後の一掃で傷付いた―それは、計画された商業高層建築や、それに伴う、南部マンハッタンの復興を妨げていた。これは、世界貿易センターの敷地を再興する事を手間取らせようとしている。ニューヨークの人々は、十分満足していたと私は思う。ジョン
・デラポータス ウエストゥ・ストゥリート連合、住民グループは、攻撃後5年を経て語った。

21:18 2016/09/13火

Only after months of fighting did officials, preservationists and survivors reach an agreement. The 38 steps of the “survivors’ stairs ” were separated from the concrete structure supporting them and moved to the underground National September 11 Memorial Museum. Meanwhile, 2 World Trade Center was allowed to go forward unencumbered by emotion-laden symbolism. Today it is a skyscraper in progress, and the developer is looking for an anchor tenant. (News Corp. and 21st Century Fox had signed a lease but pulled out in January.)
戦闘の何ヶ月か後に限り公務に当たった、歴史的建造物保存論者や生存者らは、合意に達する。「生存者の階段」の38段は、それを支えている建物から切り離され、国立9月11日記念博物館を地下に移転した。それまで、２つの世界貿易センターは、感情が―重荷を背負わされた象徴主義によって、身軽になって将来へと進む事を許された。今日では、それは、進行中の超高層ビルであり、その開発者は、頼りになるテナントを探している。（ニュース・コープや21世紀フォックスは、仮契約したものの、1月に辞退した。）

21:35 2016/09/14水

[Tim Gunn: Designers refuse to make clothes to fit American women. It’s a disgrace.]

Again and again during the past 15 years, the same questions have arisen at Ground Zero: How do you resolve the tension between a mandate to remember and a mandate to revive? How do you memorialize, while at the same time creating a space where people want to work and live and visit?
過去15年間繰り返し、同じ疑問がグラウンドゥ・ゼロで持ち上がった。
忘れまいとする民意と復興させようとする民意の間の対立をどのように貴方方は解決するのか？同時に人々が、働き、暮らし、訪れたいと願う空間を創造している一方で、貴方方は、どのように追悼するのか？

21:58 2016/09/15木

Those twin mandates have compelled continuous accommodation. As a result, the memorial at the Trade Center site is distinctly different from those commemorating the losses at the Pentagon and in Shanksville, Pa., where remembrance is the sole focus. And the revitalization of Lower Manhattan is different than any development project the city, and quite possibly the country, has ever seen.
そうした似通った民意は、途切れのない調整を強いた。結果として、貿易センター跡地での記念館は、明らかにそれらペンタゴンの、又、シャンクスヴィレにおける喪失を追悼する事とは違う。ペンシルヴ二ア、そこでは、記憶が唯一焦点整合である。そして、マンハッタン南部の復興は、嘗て見た都市や、十分有り得る田舎を計画するどんな開発より変わっている。

21:42 2016/09/16金

Gov. George Pataki helped determine the contours of the New York memorial with his unexpected declaration, in June 2002, that “we will never build where the towers stood.”
知事ジョージ・パタキは、2002年7月に、思いがけない宣言で、ニューヨーク記念館の輪郭を決めるのを手伝った。「私達は、高層ビルが建っていた所に建てるつもりはない。」

22:57 2016/09/17土

Pataki also strongly endorsed the commercial mandate to rebuild 10 million square feet of office space and replace the high-grossing retail mall at the original World Trade Center. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, as owner of the land, and Larry Silverstein and his investment partnership, as holders of a 99-year lease on the site, were insistent on the full restoration of lost office space. The Lower Manhattan business community wanted the same.
パタキも又オフィス空間の1000万フィートゥ四方を再建しようとする、又、新しい世界貿易センターの小売の商店街を元の場所に置こうとする利益優先の民意を強力に支持した。ニューヨークとニュージャージーの港湾当局は、島の所有者やラリー・シルヴァースタインや彼の投資経営事業として、その跡地の99年リース保持者として、失われたオフィス空間の完全な復元を強く主張した。南部マンハッタンの事業集団も同じ事を望んだ。

22:00 2016/09/18日

But exactly where commercial development should take place, and what should be considered hallowed ground, proved difficult to settle. Even once the idea took hold that the footprints of the twin towers should be preserved, there was disagreement on how to define the footprints and what preserving them meant.
何れにせよ、当に、何処で商業開発が列に加わるべきか、神聖化された土地をどのくらい考慮されるべきか、解決するのは容易ではないと証明した。喩え一旦考えがトゥイン・タワーの足跡は、保存されるべきであるという事になっても、足跡をどのように定義するか、それらを保存する事にどんな意味があったのかに関する不合意があった。

22:34 2016/09/19月

For example, the first set of plans prepared by the Port Authority proposed putting bus garages (necessary to accommodate the millions of people expected to visit the memorial each year) underground in the vicinity of where the towers used to be. But hat proved to be untenable. Although the towers had been built on a concrete slab, many family members objected to any non-memorial construction below ground level, all the way down to bedrock. The distinction between the symbolic and the literal did not hold meaning, especially for families who never received the remains of those they lost on 9/11. (Some 1,115 victims were never found, and a repository containing 7,930 unidentified bone fragments and other remains is maintained by the city’s chief medical examiner within the 9/11 museum.) Ultimately, officials expanded the area for rebuilding by acquiring two blocks south of the Trade Center. This accommodated the Port Authority’s infrastructure and satisfied family members.
例えば、港湾当局によって用意された当初の計画一式は、高層ビルがあった場所の周辺の地下をバスの車庫にする事を提案した。何百万もの人々が毎年記念館を訪れるよう願った。が、それは支持されないと判った。多くのファミリーメンバーが、地上階の下、岩床に向かって下る全ての道に、どのような記念物もない建物に異議を唱えた。

22:44 2016/09/20火

象徴と実際との相違に意味はなかった。特に、9/11に失ったそれらの中の遺品を受け取った事が一度もない家族にとって（約1115人の犠牲者は見付けられる事もなく、7930人収容している保管場所は、骨の断片を特定出来ず、9/11博物館内部で市の主だった医療監察官によって他の遺品は保守管理される。

22:44 2016/09/2i水

結局、役人達は、貿易センターのトゥーブロックを取得する事によって、再建の区域を拡張した。これは、港湾当局者の基本的施設に適応し、その上、ファミリーメンバーを満足させた。

22:44 2016/09/22木

A jury selected the memorial design by architect Michael Arad and landscape architect Peter Walker for its “powerful, yet simple articulation of the footprints of the Twin Towers.” Opened to the public on the 10th anniversary of the attacks, the memorial features two voids that borrow their dimensions from the destroyed towers. Each void is framed by walls of water that cascade into pools 30 feet below street level, vanishing into nowhere, seemingly never to fill up. Bronze panels contain the names of those killed on Sept. 11, 2001, and in the first World Trade Center attack, on Feb. 26, 1993. The starkness is softened by a grove of 400 swamp white oak trees. The companion museum, completed in 2014 , is beneath the memorial plaza.

[How the careless errors of credit reporting agencies are ruining people’s lives]

The commitment to the towers’ footprints presented planners with another sensitive issue: how to balance retail and reverence. Shops could not be too close to the footprints, too close to commemoration. The original master plan separated them by siting the memorial 30 feet below ground and incorporating buffer elements: cultural buildings on the north and east sides. However, when the memorial was elevated to ground level, these elements disappeared. Today, the pavilion entrance to the museum, situated between the two pools, helps in the separation. But at ground level, the visual connection between remembrance and commerce remains. Below ground, these two abut, but none of the commercial spaces have access to or visibility from the museum.

The tension inherent in the dual mandate flared once again with the opening of the museum’s gift shop, which the father of one victim called “crass commercialism on a literally sacred site.”

Another issue that has exposed tensions is culture. With the idea that Ground Zero should be a “living memorial,” planners intended spaces for the arts to help infuse the redevelopment with energy and life. But a small subset of 9/11 family members resisted anything that might interfere with the memorialization of their loved ones. The arts spaces were competition ? for public attention, donations, size and pride of place at Ground Zero. And so the families sought to disrupt the planned selection of cultural groups and successfully petitioned to reduce the scale of cultural buildings.

The victims’ families, with their unassailable emotional claim, commanded singular standing whenever they put forth deeply felt desires for specific forms of remembrance or objections to specific plans for Ground Zero. They were a political constituency, and it was very hard for any politician to push against their opposition. But once most issues relating to remembrance were settled, and the focus shifted to commercial arrangements, the power of the activist families dissipated.

Since 2011, a new place has been materializing, a place that balances remembrance of the past with optimism for the future. The many goals officials and development executives set out to achieve have been cohering. One World Trade Center anchors the skyline of Lower Manhattan, and two other commercial towers have been attracting tenants. The World Trade Center transportation hub, with its distinctive, avian-like Oculus structure, is now populated with retail stores. The eight-acre memorial quadrant, with its 400 trees, is becoming more of a park day by day ? New Yorkers who are used to small, tight spaces are reveling in its openness. The business community downtown has been cheering the long-sought-after growth that promises to accompany the thousands of new office workers, tourists and residents.

[How the government could resist President Trump’s orders]

Rebuilding Ground Zero, “a place made sacred through tragic loss,” as the memorial’s president has said, has been a perilous but essential ambition. Remembrance without rebuilding would have constituted only partial healing of the wound to New York and the nation left by the 9/11 attacks. Only the dual achievement would constitute success in the eyes of New Yorkers, the nation and the world.

That New York succeeded by the 15th anniversary of 9/11, despite a process beset by passionate controversies, political disputes, personal animosities, sensitive preservation issues, broken deadlines, intense debates about developer subsidies and quarrelsome cost overruns, has surprised many who doubted that the years of chaos could yield anything of lasting value.

It is no longer Ground Zero, though the moniker for the Trade Center site is hard to let go.

We’ll never forget 9/11. How should we remember Ground Zero?10翻訳

The Washington Post

We’ll never forget 9/11. How should we remember Ground Zero?

The tension between remembering and moving on.
By Lynne B. Sagalyn

September 9
Lynne B. Sagalyn?is a professor emerita of real estate at Columbia Business School and the author of "Power at Ground Zero: Politics, Money, and the Remaking of Lower Manhattan."

In the frequently contentious debate over Ground Zero, the Vesey Street stairs generated an especially heated conflict.
グラウンドゥ・ゼロに関する論争好きの何時もの議論の中で、ヴィージー・ストリートゥの階段は、殊の外激論を紹いた。

For hundreds of workers who managed to escape the World Trade Center complex on Sept. 11, 2001, the two flights of stairs were a cherished symbol. The stairs had led them from the site’s elevated plaza, away from the collapsing buildings and falling debris, to the relative safety of the streets beyond. In the words of one survivor, “They were the path to freedom.”
2011年9月に貿易センタ一共同ビルを何とか脱出出来た何百人もの勤め人にとって、階段の二機の飛行機は、心に秘められたシンボルだった。その階段は、敷地の高い広場から崩れ落ちて行くビルディングや落下している瓦礫から離れ、向こう側の通りの比較的安全な場所へと誘導した。 生存者の言葉に、「それが解放への細道だった。」

22:46 2016/09/11曰

For preservationists, the stairs were also important artifacts: the last above-ground remnants of the World Trade Center. “[They] will be the most dramatic original piece of the site that will have meaning to generations to come,” Richard Moe, then president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, said in 2006, when the group petitioned for the stairs to be kept in place.
歴史的建造物の保護論者にとって、その階段も又、大切な文化遺物で、世界貿易センターの決定的な地上の切れ端だった。「[それらは]、やがて来る世代への、意義ある場所の最もドゥラマティックな原型通りの一片であるに違いない。」リチャードゥ・モウ、歴史的保存の為のナショナル・トゥラストゥ会長は、2006年に語った。その団体は、その場所に階段を保存されるよう要請した。

17:01 2016/09/12月

Yet for developers and some neighborhood groups, the stairs were an eyesore― damaged not in the attack but in the subsequent cleanup ― that were impeding construction of a planned commercial tower and, with it, the revitalization of Lower Manhattan. “To the extent that this is going to delay rebuilding the World Trade Center site, I think New Yorkers have had enough,” John Dellaportas, chairman of the West Street Coalition, a neighborhood group, said five years after the attack .
依然として、開発者と一部住民グループにとって、その階段は、目障りだった―
痛んだだけでなく、その後の一掃で傷付いた―それは、計画された商業高層建築や、それに伴う、南部マンハッタンの復興を妨げていた。これは、世界貿易センターの敷地を再興する事を手間取らせようとしている。ニューヨークの人々は、十分満足していたと私は思う。ジョン
・デラポータス ウエストゥ・ストゥリート連合、住民グループは、攻撃後5年を経て語った。

21:18 2016/09/13火

Only after months of fighting did officials, preservationists and survivors reach an agreement. The 38 steps of the “survivors’ stairs ” were separated from the concrete structure supporting them and moved to the underground National September 11 Memorial Museum. Meanwhile, 2 World Trade Center was allowed to go forward unencumbered by emotion-laden symbolism. Today it is a skyscraper in progress, and the developer is looking for an anchor tenant. (News Corp. and 21st Century Fox had signed a lease but pulled out in January.)
戦闘の何ヶ月か後に限り公務に当たった、歴史的建造物保存論者や生存者らは、合意に達する。「生存者の階段」の38段は、それを支えている建物から切り離され、国立9月11日記念博物館を地下に移転した。それまで、２つの世界貿易センターは、感情が―重荷を背負わされた象徴主義によって、身軽になって将来へと進む事を許された。今日では、それは、進行中の超高層ビルであり、その開発者は、頼りになるテナントを探している。（ニュース・コープや21世紀フォックスは、仮契約したものの、1月に辞退した。）

21:35 2016/09/14水

[Tim Gunn: Designers refuse to make clothes to fit American women. It’s a disgrace.]

Again and again during the past 15 years, the same questions have arisen at Ground Zero: How do you resolve the tension between a mandate to remember and a mandate to revive? How do you memorialize, while at the same time creating a space where people want to work and live and visit?
過去15年間繰り返し、同じ疑問がグラウンドゥ・ゼロで持ち上がった。
忘れまいとする民意と復興させようとする民意の間の対立をどのように貴方方は解決するのか？同時に人々が、働き、暮らし、訪れたいと願う空間を創造している一方で、貴方方は、どのように追悼するのか？

21:58 2016/09/15木

Those twin mandates have compelled continuous accommodation. As a result, the memorial at the Trade Center site is distinctly different from those commemorating the losses at the Pentagon and in Shanksville, Pa., where remembrance is the sole focus. And the revitalization of Lower Manhattan is different than any development project the city, and quite possibly the country, has ever seen.
そうした似通った民意は、途切れのない調整を強いた。結果として、貿易センター跡地での記念館は、明らかにそれらペンタゴンの、又、シャンクスヴィレにおける喪失を追悼する事とは違う。ペンシルヴ二ア、そこでは、記憶が唯一焦点整合である。そして、マンハッタン南部の復興は、嘗て見た都市や、十分有り得る田舎を計画するどんな開発より変わっている。

21:42 2016/09/16金

Gov. George Pataki helped determine the contours of the New York memorial with his unexpected declaration, in June 2002, that “we will never build where the towers stood.”
知事ジョージ・パタキは、2002年7月に、思いがけない宣言で、ニューヨーク記念館の輪郭を決めるのを手伝った。「私達は、高層ビルが建っていた所に建てるつもりはない。」

22:57 2016/09/17土

Pataki also strongly endorsed the commercial mandate to rebuild 10 million square feet of office space and replace the high-grossing retail mall at the original World Trade Center. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, as owner of the land, and Larry Silverstein and his investment partnership, as holders of a 99-year lease on the site, were insistent on the full restoration of lost office space. The Lower Manhattan business community wanted the same.
パタキも又オフィス空間の1000万フィートゥ四方を再建しようとする、又、新しい世界貿易センターの小売の商店街を元の場所に置こうとする利益優先の民意を強力に支持した。ニューヨークとニュージャージーの港湾当局は、島の所有者やラリー・シルヴァースタインや彼の投資経営事業として、その跡地の99年リース保持者として、失われたオフィス空間の完全な復元を強く主張した。南部マンハッタンの事業集団も同じ事を望んだ。

22:00 2016/09/18日

But exactly where commercial development should take place, and what should be considered hallowed ground, proved difficult to settle. Even once the idea took hold that the footprints of the twin towers should be preserved, there was disagreement on how to define the footprints and what preserving them meant.
何れにせよ、当に、何処で商業開発が列に加わるべきか、神聖化された土地をどのくらい考慮されるべきか、解決するのは容易ではないと証明した。喩え一旦考えがトゥイン・タワーの足跡は、保存されるべきであるという事になっても、足跡をどのように定義するか、それらを保存する事にどんな意味があったのかに関する不合意があった。

22:34 2016/09/19月

For example, the first set of plans prepared by the Port Authority proposed putting bus garages (necessary to accommodate the millions of people expected to visit the memorial each year) underground in the vicinity of where the towers used to be. But hat proved to be untenable. Although the towers had been built on a concrete slab, many family members objected to any non-memorial construction below ground level, all the way down to bedrock. The distinction between the symbolic and the literal did not hold meaning, especially for families who never received the remains of those they lost on 9/11. (Some 1,115 victims were never found, and a repository containing 7,930 unidentified bone fragments and other remains is maintained by the city’s chief medical examiner within the 9/11 museum.) Ultimately, officials expanded the area for rebuilding by acquiring two blocks south of the Trade Center. This accommodated the Port Authority’s infrastructure and satisfied family members.
例えば、港湾当局によって用意された当初の計画一式は、高層ビルがあった場所の周辺の地下をバスの車庫にする事を提案した。何百万もの人々が毎年記念館を訪れるよう願った。が、それは支持されないと判った。多くのファミリーメンバーが、地上階の下、岩床に向かって下る全ての道に、どのような記念物もない建物に異議を唱えた。

22:44 2016/09/20火

象徴と実際との相違に意味はなかった。特に、9/11に失ったそれらの中の遺品を受け取った事が一度もない家族にとって（約1115人の犠牲者は見付けられる事もなく、7930人収容している保管場所は、骨の断片を特定出来ず、9/11博物館内部で市の主だった医療監察官によって他の遺品は保守管理される。

22:44 2016/09/2i水

A jury selected the memorial design by architect Michael Arad and landscape architect Peter Walker for its “powerful, yet simple articulation of the footprints of the Twin Towers.” Opened to the public on the 10th anniversary of the attacks, the memorial features two voids that borrow their dimensions from the destroyed towers. Each void is framed by walls of water that cascade into pools 30 feet below street level, vanishing into nowhere, seemingly never to fill up. Bronze panels contain the names of those killed on Sept. 11, 2001, and in the first World Trade Center attack, on Feb. 26, 1993. The starkness is softened by a grove of 400 swamp white oak trees. The companion museum, completed in 2014 , is beneath the memorial plaza.

[How the careless errors of credit reporting agencies are ruining people’s lives]

The commitment to the towers’ footprints presented planners with another sensitive issue: how to balance retail and reverence. Shops could not be too close to the footprints, too close to commemoration. The original master plan separated them by siting the memorial 30 feet below ground and incorporating buffer elements: cultural buildings on the north and east sides. However, when the memorial was elevated to ground level, these elements disappeared. Today, the pavilion entrance to the museum, situated between the two pools, helps in the separation. But at ground level, the visual connection between remembrance and commerce remains. Below ground, these two abut, but none of the commercial spaces have access to or visibility from the museum.

The tension inherent in the dual mandate flared once again with the opening of the museum’s gift shop, which the father of one victim called “crass commercialism on a literally sacred site.”

Another issue that has exposed tensions is culture. With the idea that Ground Zero should be a “living memorial,” planners intended spaces for the arts to help infuse the redevelopment with energy and life. But a small subset of 9/11 family members resisted anything that might interfere with the memorialization of their loved ones. The arts spaces were competition ? for public attention, donations, size and pride of place at Ground Zero. And so the families sought to disrupt the planned selection of cultural groups and successfully petitioned to reduce the scale of cultural buildings.

The victims’ families, with their unassailable emotional claim, commanded singular standing whenever they put forth deeply felt desires for specific forms of remembrance or objections to specific plans for Ground Zero. They were a political constituency, and it was very hard for any politician to push against their opposition. But once most issues relating to remembrance were settled, and the focus shifted to commercial arrangements, the power of the activist families dissipated.

Since 2011, a new place has been materializing, a place that balances remembrance of the past with optimism for the future. The many goals officials and development executives set out to achieve have been cohering. One World Trade Center anchors the skyline of Lower Manhattan, and two other commercial towers have been attracting tenants. The World Trade Center transportation hub, with its distinctive, avian-like Oculus structure, is now populated with retail stores. The eight-acre memorial quadrant, with its 400 trees, is becoming more of a park day by day ? New Yorkers who are used to small, tight spaces are reveling in its openness. The business community downtown has been cheering the long-sought-after growth that promises to accompany the thousands of new office workers, tourists and residents.

[How the government could resist President Trump’s orders]

Rebuilding Ground Zero, “a place made sacred through tragic loss,” as the memorial’s president has said, has been a perilous but essential ambition. Remembrance without rebuilding would have constituted only partial healing of the wound to New York and the nation left by the 9/11 attacks. Only the dual achievement would constitute success in the eyes of New Yorkers, the nation and the world.

That New York succeeded by the 15th anniversary of 9/11, despite a process beset by passionate controversies, political disputes, personal animosities, sensitive preservation issues, broken deadlines, intense debates about developer subsidies and quarrelsome cost overruns, has surprised many who doubted that the years of chaos could yield anything of lasting value.

It is no longer Ground Zero, though the moniker for the Trade Center site is hard to let go.